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Poor’s gave the World Bank an AAA foreign currency credit rating in its April 2014 report, 
and Moody’s gave it an Aaa long-term issuer credit rating in January 2014. e World Bank’s 
strong credit ratings from international rating agencies, combined with its extremely sound 
nancial management and liquidity position, give it excellent access to international capital 
markets for its programs.
In comparison, the NDB will probably have a less favourable nancial prole in the view of 
international capital markets, due to the smaller number of government shareholders and 
their lower sovereign credit ratings in comparison to the major shareholders of the World 
Bank. In addition, the nancial governance and loan portfolio of the NDB will not have an 
established track record to begin with, which will also lend it a less favourable credit rating in 
international nancial markets, and make the cost of borrowing higher.
On the other hand, the NDB is likely to benet from its access to funding from the 
state-owned banks of the BRICS countries, notably Chinese state-owned banks, which could 
provide a very large potential source of nancing for the NDB.
Stephany Grith-Jones, the eminent professor of development economics at Columbia 
University, has recently estimated that, given initial capital of US$ 100 billion, the NDB 
could be lending up to US$ 34 billion annually in 20 years’ time (UNCTAD Discussion 
Paper No. 215, April 2014); which is roughly equivalent to the current annual lending of the 
World Bank.
e exact annual lending levels of the NDB will be determined by a complex mix of factors, 
but the key point is that the governance structure of the NDB does allow for the future 
growth of the Chinese and Indian economies to be readily matched by increased capital 
subscriptions to the NDB. If the total size of the Chinese and Indian economies does indeed 
reach 25% of world GDP by 2025, as IHS long-term projections indicate, this would result 
in very sizeable increases in the NDB’s total capitalisation and in its annual lending to 
developing countries.
CHINA’S PARALLEL INITIATIVES.
China has launched other initiatives to expand infrastructure nancing for developing 
countries in Asia. In October 2014, 21 Asian countries agreed to establish a new Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) for which China will provide up to 50% of the initial 
capital. In November 2014 at the APEC Summit, President Xi also announced the creation 
of the new Silk Road Fund to improve connectivity in Asia, for which China will provide 
US$ 40 billion of capital.
China is uniquely positioned amongst large emerging markets to be capable of funding 
signicant development nance initiatives like the NDB, with foreign exchange reserves 
estimated at US$ 3.8 trillion as at December 2014. Recognising that such initiatives will 
strengthen its political and economic ties with other developing nations, China has now 
begun to exercise more signicant leadership in global development nance. In addition to 
the NDB in July 2014, China has led an initiative to create an Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB), of which the Memorandum of Understanding was signed by 21 
Asian countries on October 24th 2014. e AIIB had initial authorised capital of US$ 100 
billion, with subscribed capital likely to be around US$ 50 billion. China has stated its 
willingness to provide up to 50% of the initial capital for the AIIB. e headquarters of the 
AIIB will be located in Beijing.
e AIIB has raised concerns in some quarters about a potential rivalry with the World Bank 
or the Asian Development Bank, with some major Asia-Pacic countries having remained on 
the sidelines. For many Asian developing countries, however, the AIIB is a much-needed 
additional source of infrastructure nance, and the Chinese initiative has been warmly 
welcomed by many of them.
Like the NDB, the AIIB creates a mechanism for China and other developing countries to 
reshape the global nancial architecture in development nance. China is redoubling its 
eorts to expand its role in international development nance by committing US$ 40 billion 
to a new Silk Road Fund that is to nance infrastructure connectivity in emerging Asia. 
China made the announcement at the November 2014 APEC Leaders’ Summit in Beijing.
 
From the Chinese perspective, the NDB, AIIB and Silk Road Fund achieve a number of 
strategic objectives. Firstly, they provide developing countries a source of development 
nancing that is not under the dominion and tutelage of the Bretton Woods institutions with 
their lending conditionality and their one-sided governing mechanisms.
Secondly, China will be the key source of capital for these new institutions, which from a 
geopolitical perspective extends China’s inuence amongst developing countries, even while 
e Fortaleza Declaration claimed that the NDB will strengthen co-operation among the 
BRICS, and also supplement the work of multilateral and regional nancial institutions in 
global development. e Declaration pointedly added that the BRICS members were 
“disappointed and seriously concerned” that the 2010 IMF reforms had still not been 
implemented, and that the IMF governing structures needed to be modernised to reect the 
reality of emerging markets and developing countries.
e genesis of the NDB has at its core the determination of the BRICS to reshape the 
international nancial architecture to reect their growing economic weight (though they 
have averred their intention to co-operate with existing multilateral and regional nancial 
institutions). e NDB constitutes a dynamic mechanism for achieving this outside the 
Bretton Woods framework, while at the same time oering considerable exibility for the 
BRICS and other developing countries to expand their subscribed capital in the NDB as the 
weight of their own economies increases in the global economy. In contrast, this has proven 
very dicult to do within the Bretton Woods governance structures.
SIZE OF CAPITAL OF THE NDB.
While the initial capital for the NDB is to be provided in equal shares by the ve BRICS 
countries, the initial capital of US$ 100 billion for the CRA will be underwritten in greater 
share by China, which will provide US$ 41 billion of it. With foreign exchange reserves of 
US$ 3.8 trillion, the depth of China’s nancial strength will be the key underpinning of the 
NDB and CRA, as well as a potential source of considerable replenishment capital as the 
NDB and CRA commence operations. e important role China plays in the NDB is 
reected in the decision to locate its headquarters in Shanghai.
e initial capital of the NDB is not necessarily limited to the BRICS’ US$ 50 billion, as 
other developing countries will be invited to join and subscribe capital to the NDB. If the 
NDB is able to attract signicant subscribed capital from other sovereign states in addition 
to the BRICS, it would considerably increase the amount of total development nance that 
the NDB is able to provide. By way of comparison, as at June 2014, the total subscribed 
capital of the World Bank was US$ 233 billion, with paid-in capital of US$ 14.4 billion and 
Total Shareholder’s Equity of US$ 39 billion.
One of the strengths of the World Bank is its credit rating, reecting its sound nancial 
position as well as the strength and diversity of its government shareholders. Standard and 
TABLE 1.  BRICS VOTING RIGHTS IN THE IMF COMPARED TO GDP.
(GDP share measured in nominal US Dollar terms; IMF Voting Rights as of August 2014)
   % Share of IMF Voting Rights  % Share of World GDP
China   3.81      12.4
India   2.34      2.6
Russia   2.39      2.8
Brazil   1.72      3.0
South Africa  0.78      0.5
TOTAL  11.04      21.2
Sources: IMF; IHS
With China and India having grown more rapidly than the US and Europe for decades and 
projected to continue to do so over the next two decades, the disproportion of the BRICS 
share of IMF voting rights compared to their share of world GDP can only widen unless 
substantial reforms are made to the governance and voting rights structures of the Bretton 
Woods institutions. 
Based on IHS’ long-term projections of world GDP, China will be the world’s largest 
economy by 2025, when it will account for 19.9% of world GDP, while India is projected to 
account for 5.5%. e Asian BRICS alone will thus have over 25% of world GDP, compared 
to their combined IMF voting rights total of 6.15% at present. Unless there is far more rapid 
progress in IMF voting right reforms than is currently evident, the Asian BRICS will 
confront a major asymmetry between their weight in the global economy and their role in the 
governance of the IMF.
Equally provocative to the developing nations in regard to the governance of the Bretton 
Woods institutions is the agreement between the US and Europe that the Managing Director 
of the IMF should be European and the President of the World Bank should be American. 
is convention has been adhered to since the foundation of the IMF and World Bank; no 
developing country national has ever led either multilateral institution in the last 70 years. 
President Obama attempted to make amends for the unfairness of this state of aairs by 
nominating a US citizen of Korean ethnicity to become the World Bank President in 2012. 
But this does not fundamentally redress the gross imbalance between the BRICS’ weight in 
the global economy and their voting rights in the Bretton Woods institutions. e concerns 
amongst developing countries about the delay to IMF quota and governance reforms were 
reected in the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting held in Istanbul 
on 9-10 February 2015. is was a key issue highlighted in the G20 Communiqué released 
after the meeting:
RESHAPING THE FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE.
eir eorts to reshape the Bretton Woods governance structures having essentially come to 
naught, one initiatives that has been under discussion since 2012 amongst the BRIC 
countries was the establishment of their own development bank. A resolution to do just that 
was formally approved by the BRICS at their summit in South Africa in 2013, and detailed 
planning was subsequently undertaken in the lead-up to the 6th BRICS Summit in Fortaleza 
in July 2014. ere and then, the formal decision was taken to set up the “New Development 
Bank” (NDB) which had initial authorised capital of US$ 100 billion and initial subscribed 
capital of US$ 50 billion, along with a Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) with capital 
of US$ 100 billion.
An Inter-Governmental Agreement was signed on 15 July 2014 by Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa to establish the NDB and CRA. e initial subscribed capital of the 
NDB will be provided in equal shares by the ve founding member countries.
e remit of the NDB will be to nance infrastructure and sustainable development projects, 
while the CRA is to be an external account support facility to help developing countries 
manage balance of payments crises. 
e NDB is set up to provide loans, equity participation, guarantees and other nancial 
instruments. e BRICS members also intend the NDB to have discretion to co-operate 
with international organisations, as well as public and private organisations, particularly with 
international nancial institutions and national development banks.
 
countries have considerable experience in these principles through their regulatory and 
supervisory responsibilities in their domestic banking systems. ere is enough capacity and 
knowledge within the BRICS to craft best practice standards for the NDB and the other 
institutions now being created.
Another major challenge to the BRICS and other developing countries in attempting to 
reshape the international nancial architecture stems from signicant foreign exchange 
reserve constraints, which most developing countries still face. NDB, AIIB and Silk Road 
Fund bear potential to rapidly transform global development nance. On the other hand, it 
is unlikely the developing countries as a group can play a signicant role in international 
crisis prevention and resolution for developing countries in the near to medium term, with 
even some of the largest developing countries facing considerable challenges due to volatile 
international capital ows. 
e constraints on the foreign exchange reserves of both Russia and India have been tested by 
recent economic crises. India’s economic crisis in 2013 triggered a protracted depreciation of 
the rupee that forced the Reserve Bank of India to intervene in currency markets over a 
period of months, and deplete its foreign exchange reserves, in order to smooth the 
depreciation. e Russian economic crisis that commenced in 2014 is still unfolding: capital 
ight in 2014 was estimated by the Central Bank of Russia at US$ 128 billion (e Moscow 
Times, November 10, 2014). e Central Bank is estimated to have used up US$ 80 billion 
of its foreign exchange reserves to intervene to stabilise the sharp depreciation of the rouble 
in 2014 (Reuters News, December 17, 2014). Total foreign exchange reserves are estimated 
to have declined from US$ 510 billion at the end of 2013 to US$ 416 billion by 
mid-December 2014. 
On the other hand, China’s capacity to intervene to stabilise global crises could increase 
signicantly if China manages to introduce full currency convertibility and establish the yuan 
as a global reserve currency. But this is still a long-term goal. 
CONCLUSION.
e developing countries’ long-simmering discontent over the Bretton Woods nancial 
architecture, notably the allocation of voting rights, has resulted in a revolution in global 
development nance that is being led by China. 
China’s rapid economic ascent over the last two decades has led to its having become the 
world’s second largest economy. In the process it has acquired the capacity to act as the 
nancial mainstay of a number of new initiatives for development nancing which can be led 
by developing countries.
warted in playing the leading decision-making role in the IMF and World Bank that it 
deserves, China has instead led the creation of new multilateral development nance 
institutions governed by the developing countries. China is using its vast reserves to lend 
nancial strength to these institutions, although other developing countries are also 
providing capital.
e NDB, AIIB and Silk Road Fund combined bear potential to signicantly increase the 
total multilateral nancing available for economic development in the medium-term, and 
will give developing countries a greater voice in governing global development nance in the 
next decade and beyond.
For the present, however, the capacity of the BRICS and other developing countries to 
intervene in nancial crisis prevention and resolution remains limited due to constraints on 
the foreign exchange reserves of most large developing countries, with the possible exception 
of China. 
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it positions itself within the institutional membership as primus inter pares rather than the 
dominant shareholder driving all decision-making.
irdly, these new development institutions will be an important counterbalance to the 
political weight of the West, giving China a greater voice in global development nance. is 
will become more important politically and economically for China as it becomes the world’s 
largest economy, given that its participation in the World Bank and IMF belie its stature in 
the global economy. 
THE CHALLENGES AHEAD.
e New Development Bank and the AIIB and Silk Road Fund will face considerable 
hurdles, not least of which are the crafting of an ecient governance- and a world-class 
prudential regulatory structure that can avoid the pitfalls of overt politicisation of the new 
institutions. However, with the correct design, the BRICS’ New Development Bank could 
become an important new lender addressing the economic development and infrastructure 
nancing needs of developing countries worldwide. e establishment of the BRICS’ Bank 
at the same time as the AIIB and Silk Road Fund has the potential to signicantly reshape the 
global nancial architecture of development nance.
e governance of the new multilateral nance institutions is very much under scrutiny. To 
a large extent, this reects international perceptions about issues such as corruption in 
developing countries, with the BRICS countries still poorly perceived by international 
standards. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, which ranks 175 
countries, in 2014 had South Africa the highest ranked amongst the BRICS, at 67th, with 
Brazil in 69th place, India 85th, China 100th and Russia 136th. is is on an international 
ranking spectrum in which Denmark was 1st and North Korea and Somalia were ranked 
equally last, at 174th.
A key challenge for the founding countries of the NDB, AIIB and Silk Road Fund will be to 
establish governance structures and decision-making systems having a high degree of 
transparency, integrity, and independence from political inuence in making lending 
decisions.  
Well-established international best practices for governance of nancial institutions exist 
already, and the BRICS central banks as well as other central banks from developing 
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Poor’s gave the World Bank an AAA foreign currency credit rating in its April 2014 report, 
and Moody’s gave it an Aaa long-term issuer credit rating in January 2014. e World Bank’s 
strong credit ratings from international rating agencies, combined with its extremely sound 
nancial management and liquidity position, give it excellent access to international capital 
markets for its programs.
In comparison, the NDB will probably have a less favourable nancial prole in the view of 
international capital markets, due to the smaller number of government shareholders and 
their lower sovereign credit ratings in comparison to the major shareholders of the World 
Bank. In addition, the nancial governance and loan portfolio of the NDB will not have an 
established track record to begin with, which will also lend it a less favourable credit rating in 
international nancial markets, and make the cost of borrowing higher.
On the other hand, the NDB is likely to benet from its access to funding from the 
state-owned banks of the BRICS countries, notably Chinese state-owned banks, which could 
provide a very large potential source of nancing for the NDB.
Stephany Grith-Jones, the eminent professor of development economics at Columbia 
University, has recently estimated that, given initial capital of US$ 100 billion, the NDB 
could be lending up to US$ 34 billion annually in 20 years’ time (UNCTAD Discussion 
Paper No. 215, April 2014); which is roughly equivalent to the current annual lending of the 
World Bank.
e exact annual lending levels of the NDB will be determined by a complex mix of factors, 
but the key point is that the governance structure of the NDB does allow for the future 
growth of the Chinese and Indian economies to be readily matched by increased capital 
subscriptions to the NDB. If the total size of the Chinese and Indian economies does indeed 
reach 25% of world GDP by 2025, as IHS long-term projections indicate, this would result 
in very sizeable increases in the NDB’s total capitalisation and in its annual lending to 
developing countries.
CHINA’S PARALLEL INITIATIVES.
China has launched other initiatives to expand infrastructure nancing for developing 
countries in Asia. In October 2014, 21 Asian countries agreed to establish a new Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) for which China will provide up to 50% of the initial 
capital. In November 2014 at the APEC Summit, President Xi also announced the creation 
of the new Silk Road Fund to improve connectivity in Asia, for which China will provide 
US$ 40 billion of capital.
China is uniquely positioned amongst large emerging markets to be capable of funding 
signicant development nance initiatives like the NDB, with foreign exchange reserves 
estimated at US$ 3.8 trillion as at December 2014. Recognising that such initiatives will 
strengthen its political and economic ties with other developing nations, China has now 
begun to exercise more signicant leadership in global development nance. In addition to 
the NDB in July 2014, China has led an initiative to create an Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB), of which the Memorandum of Understanding was signed by 21 
Asian countries on October 24th 2014. e AIIB had initial authorised capital of US$ 100 
billion, with subscribed capital likely to be around US$ 50 billion. China has stated its 
willingness to provide up to 50% of the initial capital for the AIIB. e headquarters of the 
AIIB will be located in Beijing.
e AIIB has raised concerns in some quarters about a potential rivalry with the World Bank 
or the Asian Development Bank, with some major Asia-Pacic countries having remained on 
the sidelines. For many Asian developing countries, however, the AIIB is a much-needed 
additional source of infrastructure nance, and the Chinese initiative has been warmly 
welcomed by many of them.
Like the NDB, the AIIB creates a mechanism for China and other developing countries to 
reshape the global nancial architecture in development nance. China is redoubling its 
eorts to expand its role in international development nance by committing US$ 40 billion 
to a new Silk Road Fund that is to nance infrastructure connectivity in emerging Asia. 
China made the announcement at the November 2014 APEC Leaders’ Summit in Beijing.
 
From the Chinese perspective, the NDB, AIIB and Silk Road Fund achieve a number of 
strategic objectives. Firstly, they provide developing countries a source of development 
nancing that is not under the dominion and tutelage of the Bretton Woods institutions with 
their lending conditionality and their one-sided governing mechanisms.
Secondly, China will be the key source of capital for these new institutions, which from a 
geopolitical perspective extends China’s inuence amongst developing countries, even while 
e Fortaleza Declaration claimed that the NDB will strengthen co-operation among the 
BRICS, and also supplement the work of multilateral and regional nancial institutions in 
global development. e Declaration pointedly added that the BRICS members were 
“disappointed and seriously concerned” that the 2010 IMF reforms had still not been 
implemented, and that the IMF governing structures needed to be modernised to reect the 
reality of emerging markets and developing countries.
e genesis of the NDB has at its core the determination of the BRICS to reshape the 
international nancial architecture to reect their growing economic weight (though they 
have averred their intention to co-operate with existing multilateral and regional nancial 
institutions). e NDB constitutes a dynamic mechanism for achieving this outside the 
Bretton Woods framework, while at the same time oering considerable exibility for the 
BRICS and other developing countries to expand their subscribed capital in the NDB as the 
weight of their own economies increases in the global economy. In contrast, this has proven 
very dicult to do within the Bretton Woods governance structures.
SIZE OF CAPITAL OF THE NDB.
While the initial capital for the NDB is to be provided in equal shares by the ve BRICS 
countries, the initial capital of US$ 100 billion for the CRA will be underwritten in greater 
share by China, which will provide US$ 41 billion of it. With foreign exchange reserves of 
US$ 3.8 trillion, the depth of China’s nancial strength will be the key underpinning of the 
NDB and CRA, as well as a potential source of considerable replenishment capital as the 
NDB and CRA commence operations. e important role China plays in the NDB is 
reected in the decision to locate its headquarters in Shanghai.
e initial capital of the NDB is not necessarily limited to the BRICS’ US$ 50 billion, as 
other developing countries will be invited to join and subscribe capital to the NDB. If the 
NDB is able to attract signicant subscribed capital from other sovereign states in addition 
to the BRICS, it would considerably increase the amount of total development nance that 
the NDB is able to provide. By way of comparison, as at June 2014, the total subscribed 
capital of the World Bank was US$ 233 billion, with paid-in capital of US$ 14.4 billion and 
Total Shareholder’s Equity of US$ 39 billion.
One of the strengths of the World Bank is its credit rating, reecting its sound nancial 
position as well as the strength and diversity of its government shareholders. Standard and 
TABLE 1.  BRICS VOTING RIGHTS IN THE IMF COMPARED TO GDP.
(GDP share measured in nominal US Dollar terms; IMF Voting Rights as of August 2014)
   % Share of IMF Voting Rights  % Share of World GDP
China   3.81      12.4
India   2.34      2.6
Russia   2.39      2.8
Brazil   1.72      3.0
South Africa  0.78      0.5
TOTAL  11.04      21.2
Sources: IMF; IHS
With China and India having grown more rapidly than the US and Europe for decades and 
projected to continue to do so over the next two decades, the disproportion of the BRICS 
share of IMF voting rights compared to their share of world GDP can only widen unless 
substantial reforms are made to the governance and voting rights structures of the Bretton 
Woods institutions. 
Based on IHS’ long-term projections of world GDP, China will be the world’s largest 
economy by 2025, when it will account for 19.9% of world GDP, while India is projected to 
account for 5.5%. e Asian BRICS alone will thus have over 25% of world GDP, compared 
to their combined IMF voting rights total of 6.15% at present. Unless there is far more rapid 
progress in IMF voting right reforms than is currently evident, the Asian BRICS will 
confront a major asymmetry between their weight in the global economy and their role in the 
governance of the IMF.
Equally provocative to the developing nations in regard to the governance of the Bretton 
Woods institutions is the agreement between the US and Europe that the Managing Director 
of the IMF should be European and the President of the World Bank should be American. 
is convention has been adhered to since the foundation of the IMF and World Bank; no 
developing country national has ever led either multilateral institution in the last 70 years. 
President Obama attempted to make amends for the unfairness of this state of aairs by 
nominating a US citizen of Korean ethnicity to become the World Bank President in 2012. 
But this does not fundamentally redress the gross imbalance between the BRICS’ weight in 
the global economy and their voting rights in the Bretton Woods institutions. e concerns 
amongst developing countries about the delay to IMF quota and governance reforms were 
reected in the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting held in Istanbul 
on 9-10 February 2015. is was a key issue highlighted in the G20 Communiqué released 
after the meeting:
RESHAPING THE FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE.
eir eorts to reshape the Bretton Woods governance structures having essentially come to 
naught, one initiatives that has been under discussion since 2012 amongst the BRIC 
countries was the establishment of their own development bank. A resolution to do just that 
was formally approved by the BRICS at their summit in South Africa in 2013, and detailed 
planning was subsequently undertaken in the lead-up to the 6th BRICS Summit in Fortaleza 
in July 2014. ere and then, the formal decision was taken to set up the “New Development 
Bank” (NDB) which had initial authorised capital of US$ 100 billion and initial subscribed 
capital of US$ 50 billion, along with a Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) with capital 
of US$ 100 billion.
An Inter-Governmental Agreement was signed on 15 July 2014 by Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa to establish the NDB and CRA. e initial subscribed capital of the 
NDB will be provided in equal shares by the ve founding member countries.
e remit of the NDB will be to nance infrastructure and sustainable development projects, 
while the CRA is to be an external account support facility to help developing countries 
manage balance of payments crises. 
e NDB is set up to provide loans, equity participation, guarantees and other nancial 
instruments. e BRICS members also intend the NDB to have discretion to co-operate 
with international organisations, as well as public and private organisations, particularly with 
international nancial institutions and national development banks.
 
countries have considerable experience in these principles through their regulatory and 
supervisory responsibilities in their domestic banking systems. ere is enough capacity and 
knowledge within the BRICS to craft best practice standards for the NDB and the other 
institutions now being created.
Another major challenge to the BRICS and other developing countries in attempting to 
reshape the international nancial architecture stems from signicant foreign exchange 
reserve constraints, which most developing countries still face. NDB, AIIB and Silk Road 
Fund bear potential to rapidly transform global development nance. On the other hand, it 
is unlikely the developing countries as a group can play a signicant role in international 
crisis prevention and resolution for developing countries in the near to medium term, with 
even some of the largest developing countries facing considerable challenges due to volatile 
international capital ows. 
e constraints on the foreign exchange reserves of both Russia and India have been tested by 
recent economic crises. India’s economic crisis in 2013 triggered a protracted depreciation of 
the rupee that forced the Reserve Bank of India to intervene in currency markets over a 
period of months, and deplete its foreign exchange reserves, in order to smooth the 
depreciation. e Russian economic crisis that commenced in 2014 is still unfolding: capital 
ight in 2014 was estimated by the Central Bank of Russia at US$ 128 billion (e Moscow 
Times, November 10, 2014). e Central Bank is estimated to have used up US$ 80 billion 
of its foreign exchange reserves to intervene to stabilise the sharp depreciation of the rouble 
in 2014 (Reuters News, December 17, 2014). Total foreign exchange reserves are estimated 
to have declined from US$ 510 billion at the end of 2013 to US$ 416 billion by 
mid-December 2014. 
On the other hand, China’s capacity to intervene to stabilise global crises could increase 
signicantly if China manages to introduce full currency convertibility and establish the yuan 
as a global reserve currency. But this is still a long-term goal. 
CONCLUSION.
e developing countries’ long-simmering discontent over the Bretton Woods nancial 
architecture, notably the allocation of voting rights, has resulted in a revolution in global 
development nance that is being led by China. 
China’s rapid economic ascent over the last two decades has led to its having become the 
world’s second largest economy. In the process it has acquired the capacity to act as the 
nancial mainstay of a number of new initiatives for development nancing which can be led 
by developing countries.
warted in playing the leading decision-making role in the IMF and World Bank that it 
deserves, China has instead led the creation of new multilateral development nance 
institutions governed by the developing countries. China is using its vast reserves to lend 
nancial strength to these institutions, although other developing countries are also 
providing capital.
e NDB, AIIB and Silk Road Fund combined bear potential to signicantly increase the 
total multilateral nancing available for economic development in the medium-term, and 
will give developing countries a greater voice in governing global development nance in the 
next decade and beyond.
For the present, however, the capacity of the BRICS and other developing countries to 
intervene in nancial crisis prevention and resolution remains limited due to constraints on 
the foreign exchange reserves of most large developing countries, with the possible exception 
of China. 
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it positions itself within the institutional membership as primus inter pares rather than the 
dominant shareholder driving all decision-making.
irdly, these new development institutions will be an important counterbalance to the 
political weight of the West, giving China a greater voice in global development nance. is 
will become more important politically and economically for China as it becomes the world’s 
largest economy, given that its participation in the World Bank and IMF belie its stature in 
the global economy. 
THE CHALLENGES AHEAD.
e New Development Bank and the AIIB and Silk Road Fund will face considerable 
hurdles, not least of which are the crafting of an ecient governance- and a world-class 
prudential regulatory structure that can avoid the pitfalls of overt politicisation of the new 
institutions. However, with the correct design, the BRICS’ New Development Bank could 
become an important new lender addressing the economic development and infrastructure 
nancing needs of developing countries worldwide. e establishment of the BRICS’ Bank 
at the same time as the AIIB and Silk Road Fund has the potential to signicantly reshape the 
global nancial architecture of development nance.
e governance of the new multilateral nance institutions is very much under scrutiny. To 
a large extent, this reects international perceptions about issues such as corruption in 
developing countries, with the BRICS countries still poorly perceived by international 
standards. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, which ranks 175 
countries, in 2014 had South Africa the highest ranked amongst the BRICS, at 67th, with 
Brazil in 69th place, India 85th, China 100th and Russia 136th. is is on an international 
ranking spectrum in which Denmark was 1st and North Korea and Somalia were ranked 
equally last, at 174th.
A key challenge for the founding countries of the NDB, AIIB and Silk Road Fund will be to 
establish governance structures and decision-making systems having a high degree of 
transparency, integrity, and independence from political inuence in making lending 
decisions.  
Well-established international best practices for governance of nancial institutions exist 
already, and the BRICS central banks as well as other central banks from developing 
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Poor’s gave the World Bank an AAA foreign currency credit rating in its April 2014 report, 
and Moody’s gave it an Aaa long-term issuer credit rating in January 2014. e World Bank’s 
strong credit ratings from international rating agencies, combined with its extremely sound 
nancial management and liquidity position, give it excellent access to international capital 
markets for its programs.
In comparison, the NDB will probably have a less favourable nancial prole in the view of 
international capital markets, due to the smaller number of government shareholders and 
their lower sovereign credit ratings in comparison to the major shareholders of the World 
Bank. In addition, the nancial governance and loan portfolio of the NDB will not have an 
established track record to begin with, which will also lend it a less favourable credit rating in 
international nancial markets, and make the cost of borrowing higher.
On the other hand, the NDB is likely to benet from its access to funding from the 
state-owned banks of the BRICS countries, notably Chinese state-owned banks, which could 
provide a very large potential source of nancing for the NDB.
Stephany Grith-Jones, the eminent professor of development economics at Columbia 
University, has recently estimated that, given initial capital of US$ 100 billion, the NDB 
could be lending up to US$ 34 billion annually in 20 years’ time (UNCTAD Discussion 
Paper No. 215, April 2014); which is roughly equivalent to the current annual lending of the 
World Bank.
e exact annual lending levels of the NDB will be determined by a complex mix of factors, 
but the key point is that the governance structure of the NDB does allow for the future 
growth of the Chinese and Indian economies to be readily matched by increased capital 
subscriptions to the NDB. If the total size of the Chinese and Indian economies does indeed 
reach 25% of world GDP by 2025, as IHS long-term projections indicate, this would result 
in very sizeable increases in the NDB’s total capitalisation and in its annual lending to 
developing countries.
CHINA’S PARALLEL INITIATIVES.
China has launched other initiatives to expand infrastructure nancing for developing 
countries in Asia. In October 2014, 21 Asian countries agreed to establish a new Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) for which China will provide up to 50% of the initial 
capital. In November 2014 at the APEC Summit, President Xi also announced the creation 
of the new Silk Road Fund to improve connectivity in Asia, for which China will provide 
US$ 40 billion of capital.
China is uniquely positioned amongst large emerging markets to be capable of funding 
signicant development nance initiatives like the NDB, with foreign exchange reserves 
estimated at US$ 3.8 trillion as at December 2014. Recognising that such initiatives will 
strengthen its political and economic ties with other developing nations, China has now 
begun to exercise more signicant leadership in global development nance. In addition to 
the NDB in July 2014, China has led an initiative to create an Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB), of which the Memorandum of Understanding was signed by 21 
Asian countries on October 24th 2014. e AIIB had initial authorised capital of US$ 100 
billion, with subscribed capital likely to be around US$ 50 billion. China has stated its 
willingness to provide up to 50% of the initial capital for the AIIB. e headquarters of the 
AIIB will be located in Beijing.
e AIIB has raised concerns in some quarters about a potential rivalry with the World Bank 
or the Asian Development Bank, with some major Asia-Pacic countries having remained on 
the sidelines. For many Asian developing countries, however, the AIIB is a much-needed 
additional source of infrastructure nance, and the Chinese initiative has been warmly 
welcomed by many of them.
Like the NDB, the AIIB creates a mechanism for China and other developing countries to 
reshape the global nancial architecture in development nance. China is redoubling its 
eorts to expand its role in international development nance by committing US$ 40 billion 
to a new Silk Road Fund that is to nance infrastructure connectivity in emerging Asia. 
China made the announcement at the November 2014 APEC Leaders’ Summit in Beijing.
 
From the Chinese perspective, the NDB, AIIB and Silk Road Fund achieve a number of 
strategic objectives. Firstly, they provide developing countries a source of development 
nancing that is not under the dominion and tutelage of the Bretton Woods institutions with 
their lending conditionality and their one-sided governing mechanisms.
Secondly, China will be the key source of capital for these new institutions, which from a 
geopolitical perspective extends China’s inuence amongst developing countries, even while 
e Fortaleza Declaration claimed that the NDB will strengthen co-operation among the 
BRICS, and also supplement the work of multilateral and regional nancial institutions in 
global development. e Declaration pointedly added that the BRICS members were 
“disappointed and seriously concerned” that the 2010 IMF reforms had still not been 
implemented, and that the IMF governing structures needed to be modernised to reect the 
reality of emerging markets and developing countries.
e genesis of the NDB has at its core the determination of the BRICS to reshape the 
international nancial architecture to reect their growing economic weight (though they 
have averred their intention to co-operate with existing multilateral and regional nancial 
institutions). e NDB constitutes a dynamic mechanism for achieving this outside the 
Bretton Woods framework, while at the same time oering considerable exibility for the 
BRICS and other developing countries to expand their subscribed capital in the NDB as the 
weight of their own economies increases in the global economy. In contrast, this has proven 
very dicult to do within the Bretton Woods governance structures.
SIZE OF CAPITAL OF THE NDB.
While the initial capital for the NDB is to be provided in equal shares by the ve BRICS 
countries, the initial capital of US$ 100 billion for the CRA will be underwritten in greater 
share by China, which will provide US$ 41 billion of it. With foreign exchange reserves of 
US$ 3.8 trillion, the depth of China’s nancial strength will be the key underpinning of the 
NDB and CRA, as well as a potential source of considerable replenishment capital as the 
NDB and CRA commence operations. e important role China plays in the NDB is 
reected in the decision to locate its headquarters in Shanghai.
e initial capital of the NDB is not necessarily limited to the BRICS’ US$ 50 billion, as 
other developing countries will be invited to join and subscribe capital to the NDB. If the 
NDB is able to attract signicant subscribed capital from other sovereign states in addition 
to the BRICS, it would considerably increase the amount of total development nance that 
the NDB is able to provide. By way of comparison, as at June 2014, the total subscribed 
capital of the World Bank was US$ 233 billion, with paid-in capital of US$ 14.4 billion and 
Total Shareholder’s Equity of US$ 39 billion.
One of the strengths of the World Bank is its credit rating, reecting its sound nancial 
position as well as the strength and diversity of its government shareholders. Standard and 
In July 2014, the BRICS nations agreed to create a new development bank that would be 
provided with an initial capital of US$ 50 billion. eir decision reects the growing 
discontent amongst developing nations that the governance structure of the Bretton Woods 
institutions has not evolved to reect the increasing weight of emerging markets in global 
GDP. e new bank, if successfully implemented, could give the BRICS nations greater 
inuence in global development nancing.
BRICS’ DISCONTENT WITH THE BRETTON WOODS ARCHITECTURE.
e decision by the BRICS nations in July 2014 to establish a new development bank in 
which they would hold at least 55% of the capital is their answer to mounting discontent 
with the voting structure of the Bretton Woods institutions, which remain dominated by the 
US and Europe.
When the IMF and the IBRD were created at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, the 
governance and voting structures of these institutions, with a total of 44 founding member 
nations, were dominated by the US and Europe. With the decline of colonialism in the 1950s 
and 1960s, the number of member countries of the IMF and World Bank rose from 44 to 
188 as the former European colonies gained independence. Moreover, the share of world 
GDP belonging to developing countries has risen signicantly. e world economy has 
changed dramatically in the seventy years since Bretton Woods, but the IMF and World 
Bank’s governance structures have hardly evolved since 1944. 
Despite the sustained eorts of developing countries to urge reforms of Bretton Woods to 
reect the greater economic weight of developing nations, the pace of changes in the 
distribution of voting rights has been glacial, even while the status quo is distorted, most 
notably for China amongst the BRICS nations. For example, the US controls 16.75% of 
voting rights in the IMF, while China, the world’s second largest economy, has 3.81%. Even 
France, with a GDP in nominal US Dollar terms around one-third the size of China’s in 
2013, has 4.29% of IMF voting rights, slightly more than China’s. e share of IMF voting 
rights of the BRICS as a whole currently totals 11.04%, whereas their share of world GDP is 
21.2%.
TABLE 1.  BRICS VOTING RIGHTS IN THE IMF COMPARED TO GDP.
(GDP share measured in nominal US Dollar terms; IMF Voting Rights as of August 2014)
   % Share of IMF Voting Rights  % Share of World GDP
China   3.81      12.4
India   2.34      2.6
Russia   2.39      2.8
Brazil   1.72      3.0
South Africa  0.78      0.5
TOTAL  11.04      21.2
Sources: IMF; IHS
With China and India having grown more rapidly than the US and Europe for decades and 
projected to continue to do so over the next two decades, the disproportion of the BRICS 
share of IMF voting rights compared to their share of world GDP can only widen unless 
substantial reforms are made to the governance and voting rights structures of the Bretton 
Woods institutions. 
Based on IHS’ long-term projections of world GDP, China will be the world’s largest 
economy by 2025, when it will account for 19.9% of world GDP, while India is projected to 
account for 5.5%. e Asian BRICS alone will thus have over 25% of world GDP, compared 
to their combined IMF voting rights total of 6.15% at present. Unless there is far more rapid 
progress in IMF voting right reforms than is currently evident, the Asian BRICS will 
confront a major asymmetry between their weight in the global economy and their role in the 
governance of the IMF.
Equally provocative to the developing nations in regard to the governance of the Bretton 
Woods institutions is the agreement between the US and Europe that the Managing Director 
of the IMF should be European and the President of the World Bank should be American. 
is convention has been adhered to since the foundation of the IMF and World Bank; no 
developing country national has ever led either multilateral institution in the last 70 years. 
President Obama attempted to make amends for the unfairness of this state of aairs by 
nominating a US citizen of Korean ethnicity to become the World Bank President in 2012. 
But this does not fundamentally redress the gross imbalance between the BRICS’ weight in 
the global economy and their voting rights in the Bretton Woods institutions. e concerns 
amongst developing countries about the delay to IMF quota and governance reforms were 
reected in the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting held in Istanbul 
on 9-10 February 2015. is was a key issue highlighted in the G20 Communiqué released 
after the meeting:
RESHAPING THE FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE.
eir eorts to reshape the Bretton Woods governance structures having essentially come to 
naught, one initiatives that has been under discussion since 2012 amongst the BRIC 
countries was the establishment of their own development bank. A resolution to do just that 
was formally approved by the BRICS at their summit in South Africa in 2013, and detailed 
planning was subsequently undertaken in the lead-up to the 6th BRICS Summit in Fortaleza 
in July 2014. ere and then, the formal decision was taken to set up the “New Development 
Bank” (NDB) which had initial authorised capital of US$ 100 billion and initial subscribed 
capital of US$ 50 billion, along with a Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) with capital 
of US$ 100 billion.
An Inter-Governmental Agreement was signed on 15 July 2014 by Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa to establish the NDB and CRA. e initial subscribed capital of the 
NDB will be provided in equal shares by the ve founding member countries.
e remit of the NDB will be to nance infrastructure and sustainable development projects, 
while the CRA is to be an external account support facility to help developing countries 
manage balance of payments crises. 
e NDB is set up to provide loans, equity participation, guarantees and other nancial 
instruments. e BRICS members also intend the NDB to have discretion to co-operate 
with international organisations, as well as public and private organisations, particularly with 
international nancial institutions and national development banks.
 
countries have considerable experience in these principles through their regulatory and 
supervisory responsibilities in their domestic banking systems. ere is enough capacity and 
knowledge within the BRICS to craft best practice standards for the NDB and the other 
institutions now being created.
Another major challenge to the BRICS and other developing countries in attempting to 
reshape the international nancial architecture stems from signicant foreign exchange 
reserve constraints, which most developing countries still face. NDB, AIIB and Silk Road 
Fund bear potential to rapidly transform global development nance. On the other hand, it 
is unlikely the developing countries as a group can play a signicant role in international 
crisis prevention and resolution for developing countries in the near to medium term, with 
even some of the largest developing countries facing considerable challenges due to volatile 
international capital ows. 
e constraints on the foreign exchange reserves of both Russia and India have been tested by 
recent economic crises. India’s economic crisis in 2013 triggered a protracted depreciation of 
the rupee that forced the Reserve Bank of India to intervene in currency markets over a 
period of months, and deplete its foreign exchange reserves, in order to smooth the 
depreciation. e Russian economic crisis that commenced in 2014 is still unfolding: capital 
ight in 2014 was estimated by the Central Bank of Russia at US$ 128 billion (e Moscow 
Times, November 10, 2014). e Central Bank is estimated to have used up US$ 80 billion 
of its foreign exchange reserves to intervene to stabilise the sharp depreciation of the rouble 
in 2014 (Reuters News, December 17, 2014). Total foreign exchange reserves are estimated 
to have declined from US$ 510 billion at the end of 2013 to US$ 416 billion by 
mid-December 2014. 
On the other hand, China’s capacity to intervene to stabilise global crises could increase 
signicantly if China manages to introduce full currency convertibility and establish the yuan 
as a global reserve currency. But this is still a long-term goal. 
CONCLUSION.
e developing countries’ long-simmering discontent over the Bretton Woods nancial 
architecture, notably the allocation of voting rights, has resulted in a revolution in global 
development nance that is being led by China. 
China’s rapid economic ascent over the last two decades has led to its having become the 
world’s second largest economy. In the process it has acquired the capacity to act as the 
nancial mainstay of a number of new initiatives for development nancing which can be led 
by developing countries.
warted in playing the leading decision-making role in the IMF and World Bank that it 
deserves, China has instead led the creation of new multilateral development nance 
institutions governed by the developing countries. China is using its vast reserves to lend 
nancial strength to these institutions, although other developing countries are also 
providing capital.
e NDB, AIIB and Silk Road Fund combined bear potential to signicantly increase the 
total multilateral nancing available for economic development in the medium-term, and 
will give developing countries a greater voice in governing global development nance in the 
next decade and beyond.
For the present, however, the capacity of the BRICS and other developing countries to 
intervene in nancial crisis prevention and resolution remains limited due to constraints on 
the foreign exchange reserves of most large developing countries, with the possible exception 
of China. 
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it positions itself within the institutional membership as primus inter pares rather than the 
dominant shareholder driving all decision-making.
irdly, these new development institutions will be an important counterbalance to the 
political weight of the West, giving China a greater voice in global development nance. is 
will become more important politically and economically for China as it becomes the world’s 
largest economy, given that its participation in the World Bank and IMF belie its stature in 
the global economy. 
THE CHALLENGES AHEAD.
e New Development Bank and the AIIB and Silk Road Fund will face considerable 
hurdles, not least of which are the crafting of an ecient governance- and a world-class 
prudential regulatory structure that can avoid the pitfalls of overt politicisation of the new 
institutions. However, with the correct design, the BRICS’ New Development Bank could 
become an important new lender addressing the economic development and infrastructure 
nancing needs of developing countries worldwide. e establishment of the BRICS’ Bank 
at the same time as the AIIB and Silk Road Fund has the potential to signicantly reshape the 
global nancial architecture of development nance.
e governance of the new multilateral nance institutions is very much under scrutiny. To 
a large extent, this reects international perceptions about issues such as corruption in 
developing countries, with the BRICS countries still poorly perceived by international 
standards. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, which ranks 175 
countries, in 2014 had South Africa the highest ranked amongst the BRICS, at 67th, with 
Brazil in 69th place, India 85th, China 100th and Russia 136th. is is on an international 
ranking spectrum in which Denmark was 1st and North Korea and Somalia were ranked 
equally last, at 174th.
A key challenge for the founding countries of the NDB, AIIB and Silk Road Fund will be to 
establish governance structures and decision-making systems having a high degree of 
transparency, integrity, and independence from political inuence in making lending 
decisions.  
Well-established international best practices for governance of nancial institutions exist 
already, and the BRICS central banks as well as other central banks from developing 
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Poor’s gave the World Bank an AAA foreign currency credit rating in its April 2014 report, 
and Moody’s gave it an Aaa long-term issuer credit rating in January 2014. e World Bank’s 
strong credit ratings from international rating agencies, combined with its extremely sound 
nancial management and liquidity position, give it excellent access to international capital 
markets for its programs.
In comparison, the NDB will probably have a less favourable nancial prole in the view of 
international capital markets, due to the smaller number of government shareholders and 
their lower sovereign credit ratings in comparison to the major shareholders of the World 
Bank. In addition, the nancial governance and loan portfolio of the NDB will not have an 
established track record to begin with, which will also lend it a less favourable credit rating in 
international nancial markets, and make the cost of borrowing higher.
On the other hand, the NDB is likely to benet from its access to funding from the 
state-owned banks of the BRICS countries, notably Chinese state-owned banks, which could 
provide a very large potential source of nancing for the NDB.
Stephany Grith-Jones, the eminent professor of development economics at Columbia 
University, has recently estimated that, given initial capital of US$ 100 billion, the NDB 
could be lending up to US$ 34 billion annually in 20 years’ time (UNCTAD Discussion 
Paper No. 215, April 2014); which is roughly equivalent to the current annual lending of the 
World Bank.
e exact annual lending levels of the NDB will be determined by a complex mix of factors, 
but the key point is that the governance structure of the NDB does allow for the future 
growth of the Chinese and Indian economies to be readily matched by increased capital 
subscriptions to the NDB. If the total size of the Chinese and Indian economies does indeed 
reach 25% of world GDP by 2025, as IHS long-term projections indicate, this would result 
in very sizeable increases in the NDB’s total capitalisation and in its annual lending to 
developing countries.
CHINA’S PARALLEL INITIATIVES.
China has launched other initiatives to expand infrastructure nancing for developing 
countries in Asia. In October 2014, 21 Asian countries agreed to establish a new Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) for which China will provide up to 50% of the initial 
capital. In November 2014 at the APEC Summit, President Xi also announced the creation 
of the new Silk Road Fund to improve connectivity in Asia, for which China will provide 
US$ 40 billion of capital.
China is uniquely positioned amongst large emerging markets to be capable of funding 
signicant development nance initiatives like the NDB, with foreign exchange reserves 
estimated at US$ 3.8 trillion as at December 2014. Recognising that such initiatives will 
strengthen its political and economic ties with other developing nations, China has now 
begun to exercise more signicant leadership in global development nance. In addition to 
the NDB in July 2014, China has led an initiative to create an Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB), of which the Memorandum of Understanding was signed by 21 
Asian countries on October 24th 2014. e AIIB had initial authorised capital of US$ 100 
billion, with subscribed capital likely to be around US$ 50 billion. China has stated its 
willingness to provide up to 50% of the initial capital for the AIIB. e headquarters of the 
AIIB will be located in Beijing.
e AIIB has raised concerns in some quarters about a potential rivalry with the World Bank 
or the Asian Development Bank, with some major Asia-Pacic countries having remained on 
the sidelines. For many Asian developing countries, however, the AIIB is a much-needed 
additional source of infrastructure nance, and the Chinese initiative has been warmly 
welcomed by many of them.
Like the NDB, the AIIB creates a mechanism for China and other developing countries to 
reshape the global nancial architecture in development nance. China is redoubling its 
eorts to expand its role in international development nance by committing US$ 40 billion 
to a new Silk Road Fund that is to nance infrastructure connectivity in emerging Asia. 
China made the announcement at the November 2014 APEC Leaders’ Summit in Beijing.
 
From the Chinese perspective, the NDB, AIIB and Silk Road Fund achieve a number of 
strategic objectives. Firstly, they provide developing countries a source of development 
nancing that is not under the dominion and tutelage of the Bretton Woods institutions with 
their lending conditionality and their one-sided governing mechanisms.
Secondly, China will be the key source of capital for these new institutions, which from a 
geopolitical perspective extends China’s inuence amongst developing countries, even while 
e Fortaleza Declaration claimed that the NDB will strengthen co-operation among the 
BRICS, and also supplement the work of multilateral and regional nancial institutions in 
global development. e Declaration pointedly added that the BRICS members were 
“disappointed and seriously concerned” that the 2010 IMF reforms had still not been 
implemented, and that the IMF governing structures needed to be modernised to reect the 
reality of emerging markets and developing countries.
e genesis of the NDB has at its core the determination of the BRICS to reshape the 
international nancial architecture to reect their growing economic weight (though they 
have averred their intention to co-operate with existing multilateral and regional nancial 
institutions). e NDB constitutes a dynamic mechanism for achieving this outside the 
Bretton Woods framework, while at the same time oering considerable exibility for the 
BRICS and other developing countries to expand their subscribed capital in the NDB as the 
weight of their own economies increases in the global economy. In contrast, this has proven 
very dicult to do within the Bretton Woods governance structures.
SIZE OF CAPITAL OF THE NDB.
While the initial capital for the NDB is to be provided in equal shares by the ve BRICS 
countries, the initial capital of US$ 100 billion for the CRA will be underwritten in greater 
share by China, which will provide US$ 41 billion of it. With foreign exchange reserves of 
US$ 3.8 trillion, the depth of China’s nancial strength will be the key underpinning of the 
NDB and CRA, as well as a potential source of considerable replenishment capital as the 
NDB and CRA commence operations. e important role China plays in the NDB is 
reected in the decision to locate its headquarters in Shanghai.
e initial capital of the NDB is not necessarily limited to the BRICS’ US$ 50 billion, as 
other developing countries will be invited to join and subscribe capital to the NDB. If the 
NDB is able to attract signicant subscribed capital from other sovereign states in addition 
to the BRICS, it would considerably increase the amount of total development nance that 
the NDB is able to provide. By way of comparison, as at June 2014, the total subscribed 
capital of the World Bank was US$ 233 billion, with paid-in capital of US$ 14.4 billion and 
Total Shareholder’s Equity of US$ 39 billion.
One of the strengths of the World Bank is its credit rating, reecting its sound nancial 
position as well as the strength and diversity of its government shareholders. Standard and 
TABLE 1.  BRICS VOTING RIGHTS IN THE IMF COMPARED TO GDP.
(GDP share measured in nominal US Dollar terms; IMF Voting Rights as of August 2014)
   % Share of IMF Voting Rights  % Share of World GDP
China   3.81      12.4
India   2.34      2.6
Russia   2.39      2.8
Brazil   1.72      3.0
South Africa  0.78      0.5
TOTAL  11.04      21.2
Sources: IMF; IHS
With China and India having grown more rapidly than the US and Europe for decades and 
projected to continue to do so over the next two decades, the disproportion of the BRICS 
share of IMF voting rights compared to their share of world GDP can only widen unless 
substantial reforms are made to the governance and voting rights structures of the Bretton 
Woods institutions. 
Based on IHS’ long-term projections of world GDP, China will be the world’s largest 
economy by 2025, when it will account for 19.9% of world GDP, while India is projected to 
account for 5.5%. e Asian BRICS alone will thus have over 25% of world GDP, compared 
to their combined IMF voting rights total of 6.15% at present. Unless there is far more rapid 
progress in IMF voting right reforms than is currently evident, the Asian BRICS will 
confront a major asymmetry between their weight in the global economy and their role in the 
governance of the IMF.
Equally provocative to the developing nations in regard to the governance of the Bretton 
Woods institutions is the agreement between the US and Europe that the Managing Director 
of the IMF should be European and the President of the World Bank should be American. 
is convention has been adhered to since the foundation of the IMF and World Bank; no 
developing country national has ever led either multilateral institution in the last 70 years. 
President Obama attempted to make amends for the unfairness of this state of aairs by 
nominating a US citizen of Korean ethnicity to become the World Bank President in 2012. 
But this does not fundamentally redress the gross imbalance between the BRICS’ weight in 
the global economy and their voting rights in the Bretton Woods institutions. e concerns 
amongst developing countries about the delay to IMF quota and governance reforms were 
reected in the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting held in Istanbul 
on 9-10 February 2015. is was a key issue highlighted in the G20 Communiqué released 
after the meeting:
RESHAPING THE FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE.
eir eorts to reshape the Bretton Woods governance structures having essentially come to 
naught, one initiatives that has been under discussion since 2012 amongst the BRIC 
countries was the establishment of their own development bank. A resolution to do just that 
was formally approved by the BRICS at their summit in South Africa in 2013, and detailed 
planning was subsequently undertaken in the lead-up to the 6th BRICS Summit in Fortaleza 
in July 2014. ere and then, the formal decision was taken to set up the “New Development 
Bank” (NDB) which had initial authorised capital of US$ 100 billion and initial subscribed 
capital of US$ 50 billion, along with a Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) with capital 
of US$ 100 billion.
An Inter-Governmental Agreement was signed on 15 July 2014 by Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa to establish the NDB and CRA. e initial subscribed capital of the 
NDB will be provided in equal shares by the ve founding member countries.
e remit of the NDB will be to nance infrastructure and sustainable development projects, 
while the CRA is to be an external account support facility to help developing countries 
manage balance of payments crises. 
e NDB is set up to provide loans, equity participation, guarantees and other nancial 
instruments. e BRICS members also intend the NDB to have discretion to co-operate 
with international organisations, as well as public and private organisations, particularly with 
international nancial institutions and national development banks.
 
countries have considerable experience in these principles through their regulatory and 
supervisory responsibilities in their domestic banking systems. ere is enough capacity and 
knowledge within the BRICS to craft best practice standards for the NDB and the other 
institutions now being created.
Another major challenge to the BRICS and other developing countries in attempting to 
reshape the international nancial architecture stems from signicant foreign exchange 
reserve constraints, which most developing countries still face. NDB, AIIB and Silk Road 
Fund bear potential to rapidly transform global development nance. On the other hand, it 
is unlikely the developing countries as a group can play a signicant role in international 
crisis prevention and resolution for developing countries in the near to medium term, with 
even some of the largest developing countries facing considerable challenges due to volatile 
international capital ows. 
e constraints on the foreign exchange reserves of both Russia and India have been tested by 
recent economic crises. India’s economic crisis in 2013 triggered a protracted depreciation of 
the rupee that forced the Reserve Bank of India to intervene in currency markets over a 
period of months, and deplete its foreign exchange reserves, in order to smooth the 
depreciation. e Russian economic crisis that commenced in 2014 is still unfolding: capital 
ight in 2014 was estimated by the Central Bank of Russia at US$ 128 billion (e Moscow 
Times, November 10, 2014). e Central Bank is estimated to have used up US$ 80 billion 
of its foreign exchange reserves to intervene to stabilise the sharp depreciation of the rouble 
in 2014 (Reuters News, December 17, 2014). Total foreign exchange reserves are estimated 
to have declined from US$ 510 billion at the end of 2013 to US$ 416 billion by 
mid-December 2014. 
On the other hand, China’s capacity to intervene to stabilise global crises could increase 
signicantly if China manages to introduce full currency convertibility and establish the yuan 
as a global reserve currency. But this is still a long-term goal. 
CONCLUSION.
e developing countries’ long-simmering discontent over the Bretton Woods nancial 
architecture, notably the allocation of voting rights, has resulted in a revolution in global 
development nance that is being led by China. 
China’s rapid economic ascent over the last two decades has led to its having become the 
world’s second largest economy. In the process it has acquired the capacity to act as the 
nancial mainstay of a number of new initiatives for development nancing which can be led 
by developing countries.
warted in playing the leading decision-making role in the IMF and World Bank that it 
deserves, China has instead led the creation of new multilateral development nance 
institutions governed by the developing countries. China is using its vast reserves to lend 
nancial strength to these institutions, although other developing countries are also 
providing capital.
e NDB, AIIB and Silk Road Fund combined bear potential to signicantly increase the 
total multilateral nancing available for economic development in the medium-term, and 
will give developing countries a greater voice in governing global development nance in the 
next decade and beyond.
For the present, however, the capacity of the BRICS and other developing countries to 
intervene in nancial crisis prevention and resolution remains limited due to constraints on 
the foreign exchange reserves of most large developing countries, with the possible exception 
of China. 
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it positions itself within the institutional membership as primus inter pares rather than the 
dominant shareholder driving all decision-making.
irdly, these new development institutions will be an important counterbalance to the 
political weight of the West, giving China a greater voice in global development nance. is 
will become more important politically and economically for China as it becomes the world’s 
largest economy, given that its participation in the World Bank and IMF belie its stature in 
the global economy. 
THE CHALLENGES AHEAD.
e New Development Bank and the AIIB and Silk Road Fund will face considerable 
hurdles, not least of which are the crafting of an ecient governance- and a world-class 
prudential regulatory structure that can avoid the pitfalls of overt politicisation of the new 
institutions. However, with the correct design, the BRICS’ New Development Bank could 
become an important new lender addressing the economic development and infrastructure 
nancing needs of developing countries worldwide. e establishment of the BRICS’ Bank 
at the same time as the AIIB and Silk Road Fund has the potential to signicantly reshape the 
global nancial architecture of development nance.
e governance of the new multilateral nance institutions is very much under scrutiny. To 
a large extent, this reects international perceptions about issues such as corruption in 
developing countries, with the BRICS countries still poorly perceived by international 
standards. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, which ranks 175 
countries, in 2014 had South Africa the highest ranked amongst the BRICS, at 67th, with 
Brazil in 69th place, India 85th, China 100th and Russia 136th. is is on an international 
ranking spectrum in which Denmark was 1st and North Korea and Somalia were ranked 
equally last, at 174th.
A key challenge for the founding countries of the NDB, AIIB and Silk Road Fund will be to 
establish governance structures and decision-making systems having a high degree of 
transparency, integrity, and independence from political inuence in making lending 
decisions.  
Well-established international best practices for governance of nancial institutions exist 
already, and the BRICS central banks as well as other central banks from developing 
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Poor’s gave the World Bank an AAA foreign currency credit rating in its April 2014 report, 
and Moody’s gave it an Aaa long-term issuer credit rating in January 2014. e World Bank’s 
strong credit ratings from international rating agencies, combined with its extremely sound 
nancial management and liquidity position, give it excellent access to international capital 
markets for its programs.
In comparison, the NDB will probably have a less favourable nancial prole in the view of 
international capital markets, due to the smaller number of government shareholders and 
their lower sovereign credit ratings in comparison to the major shareholders of the World 
Bank. In addition, the nancial governance and loan portfolio of the NDB will not have an 
established track record to begin with, which will also lend it a less favourable credit rating in 
international nancial markets, and make the cost of borrowing higher.
On the other hand, the NDB is likely to benet from its access to funding from the 
state-owned banks of the BRICS countries, notably Chinese state-owned banks, which could 
provide a very large potential source of nancing for the NDB.
Stephany Grith-Jones, the eminent professor of development economics at Columbia 
University, has recently estimated that, given initial capital of US$ 100 billion, the NDB 
could be lending up to US$ 34 billion annually in 20 years’ time (UNCTAD Discussion 
Paper No. 215, April 2014); which is roughly equivalent to the current annual lending of the 
World Bank.
e exact annual lending levels of the NDB will be determined by a complex mix of factors, 
but the key point is that the governance structure of the NDB does allow for the future 
growth of the Chinese and Indian economies to be readily matched by increased capital 
subscriptions to the NDB. If the total size of the Chinese and Indian economies does indeed 
reach 25% of world GDP by 2025, as IHS long-term projections indicate, this would result 
in very sizeable increases in the NDB’s total capitalisation and in its annual lending to 
developing countries.
CHINA’S PARALLEL INITIATIVES.
China has launched other initiatives to expand infrastructure nancing for developing 
countries in Asia. In October 2014, 21 Asian countries agreed to establish a new Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) for which China will provide up to 50% of the initial 
capital. In November 2014 at the APEC Summit, President Xi also announced the creation 
of the new Silk Road Fund to improve connectivity in Asia, for which China will provide 
US$ 40 billion of capital.
China is uniquely positioned amongst large emerging markets to be capable of funding 
signicant development nance initiatives like the NDB, with foreign exchange reserves 
estimated at US$ 3.8 trillion as at December 2014. Recognising that such initiatives will 
strengthen its political and economic ties with other developing nations, China has now 
begun to exercise more signicant leadership in global development nance. In addition to 
the NDB in July 2014, China has led an initiative to create an Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB), of which the Memorandum of Understanding was signed by 21 
Asian countries on October 24th 2014. e AIIB had initial authorised capital of US$ 100 
billion, with subscribed capital likely to be around US$ 50 billion. China has stated its 
willingness to provide up to 50% of the initial capital for the AIIB. e headquarters of the 
AIIB will be located in Beijing.
e AIIB has raised concerns in some quarters about a potential rivalry with the World Bank 
or the Asian Development Bank, with some major Asia-Pacic countries having remained on 
the sidelines. For many Asian developing countries, however, the AIIB is a much-needed 
additional source of infrastructure nance, and the Chinese initiative has been warmly 
welcomed by many of them.
Like the NDB, the AIIB creates a mechanism for China and other developing countries to 
reshape the global nancial architecture in development nance. China is redoubling its 
eorts to expand its role in international development nance by committing US$ 40 billion 
to a new Silk Road Fund that is to nance infrastructure connectivity in emerging Asia. 
China made the announcement at the November 2014 APEC Leaders’ Summit in Beijing.
 
From the Chinese perspective, the NDB, AIIB and Silk Road Fund achieve a number of 
strategic objectives. Firstly, they provide developing countries a source of development 
nancing that is not under the dominion and tutelage of the Bretton Woods institutions with 
their lending conditionality and their one-sided governing mechanisms.
Secondly, China will be the key source of capital for these new institutions, which from a 
geopolitical perspective extends China’s inuence amongst developing countries, even while 
e Fortaleza Declaration claimed that the NDB will strengthen co-operation among the 
BRICS, and also supplement the work of multilateral and regional nancial institutions in 
global development. e Declaration pointedly added that the BRICS members were 
“disappointed and seriously concerned” that the 2010 IMF reforms had still not been 
implemented, and that the IMF governing structures needed to be modernised to reect the 
reality of emerging markets and developing countries.
e genesis of the NDB has at its core the determination of the BRICS to reshape the 
international nancial architecture to reect their growing economic weight (though they 
have averred their intention to co-operate with existing multilateral and regional nancial 
institutions). e NDB constitutes a dynamic mechanism for achieving this outside the 
Bretton Woods framework, while at the same time oering considerable exibility for the 
BRICS and other developing countries to expand their subscribed capital in the NDB as the 
weight of their own economies increases in the global economy. In contrast, this has proven 
very dicult to do within the Bretton Woods governance structures.
SIZE OF CAPITAL OF THE NDB.
While the initial capital for the NDB is to be provided in equal shares by the ve BRICS 
countries, the initial capital of US$ 100 billion for the CRA will be underwritten in greater 
share by China, which will provide US$ 41 billion of it. With foreign exchange reserves of 
US$ 3.8 trillion, the depth of China’s nancial strength will be the key underpinning of the 
NDB and CRA, as well as a potential source of considerable replenishment capital as the 
NDB and CRA commence operations. e important role China plays in the NDB is 
reected in the decision to locate its headquarters in Shanghai.
e initial capital of the NDB is not necessarily limited to the BRICS’ US$ 50 billion, as 
other developing countries will be invited to join and subscribe capital to the NDB. If the 
NDB is able to attract signicant subscribed capital from other sovereign states in addition 
to the BRICS, it would considerably increase the amount of total development nance that 
the NDB is able to provide. By way of comparison, as at June 2014, the total subscribed 
capital of the World Bank was US$ 233 billion, with paid-in capital of US$ 14.4 billion and 
Total Shareholder’s Equity of US$ 39 billion.
One of the strengths of the World Bank is its credit rating, reecting its sound nancial 
position as well as the strength and diversity of its government shareholders. Standard and 
TABLE 1.  BRICS VOTING RIGHTS IN THE IMF COMPARED TO GDP.
(GDP share measured in nominal US Dollar terms; IMF Voting Rights as of August 2014)
   % Share of IMF Voting Rights  % Share of World GDP
China   3.81      12.4
India   2.34      2.6
Russia   2.39      2.8
Brazil   1.72      3.0
South Africa  0.78      0.5
TOTAL  11.04      21.2
Sources: IMF; IHS
With China and India having grown more rapidly than the US and Europe for decades and 
projected to continue to do so over the next two decades, the disproportion of the BRICS 
share of IMF voting rights compared to their share of world GDP can only widen unless 
substantial reforms are made to the governance and voting rights structures of the Bretton 
Woods institutions. 
Based on IHS’ long-term projections of world GDP, China will be the world’s largest 
economy by 2025, when it will account for 19.9% of world GDP, while India is projected to 
account for 5.5%. e Asian BRICS alone will thus have over 25% of world GDP, compared 
to their combined IMF voting rights total of 6.15% at present. Unless there is far more rapid 
progress in IMF voting right reforms than is currently evident, the Asian BRICS will 
confront a major asymmetry between their weight in the global economy and their role in the 
governance of the IMF.
Equally provocative to the developing nations in regard to the governance of the Bretton 
Woods institutions is the agreement between the US and Europe that the Managing Director 
of the IMF should be European and the President of the World Bank should be American. 
is convention has been adhered to since the foundation of the IMF and World Bank; no 
developing country national has ever led either multilateral institution in the last 70 years. 
President Obama attempted to make amends for the unfairness of this state of aairs by 
nominating a US citizen of Korean ethnicity to become the World Bank President in 2012. 
But this does not fundamentally redress the gross imbalance between the BRICS’ weight in 
the global economy and their voting rights in the Bretton Woods institutions. e concerns 
amongst developing countries about the delay to IMF quota and governance reforms were 
reected in the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting held in Istanbul 
on 9-10 February 2015. is was a key issue highlighted in the G20 Communiqué released 
after the meeting:
RESHAPING THE FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE.
eir eorts to reshape the Bretton Woods governance structures having essentially come to 
naught, one initiatives that has been under discussion since 2012 amongst the BRIC 
countries was the establishment of their own development bank. A resolution to do just that 
was formally approved by the BRICS at their summit in South Africa in 2013, and detailed 
planning was subsequently undertaken in the lead-up to the 6th BRICS Summit in Fortaleza 
in July 2014. ere and then, the formal decision was taken to set up the “New Development 
Bank” (NDB) which had initial authorised capital of US$ 100 billion and initial subscribed 
capital of US$ 50 billion, along with a Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) with capital 
of US$ 100 billion.
An Inter-Governmental Agreement was signed on 15 July 2014 by Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa to establish the NDB and CRA. e initial subscribed capital of the 
NDB will be provided in equal shares by the ve founding member countries.
e remit of the NDB will be to nance infrastructure and sustainable development projects, 
while the CRA is to be an external account support facility to help developing countries 
manage balance of payments crises. 
e NDB is set up to provide loans, equity participation, guarantees and other nancial 
instruments. e BRICS members also intend the NDB to have discretion to co-operate 
with international organisations, as well as public and private organisations, particularly with 
international nancial institutions and national development banks.
 
countries have considerable experience in these principles through their regulatory and 
supervisory responsibilities in their domestic banking systems. ere is enough capacity and 
knowledge within the BRICS to craft best practice standards for the NDB and the other 
institutions now being created.
Another major challenge to the BRICS and other developing countries in attempting to 
reshape the international nancial architecture stems from signicant foreign exchange 
reserve constraints, which most developing countries still face. NDB, AIIB and Silk Road 
Fund bear potential to rapidly transform global development nance. On the other hand, it 
is unlikely the developing countries as a group can play a signicant role in international 
crisis prevention and resolution for developing countries in the near to medium term, with 
even some of the largest developing countries facing considerable challenges due to volatile 
international capital ows. 
e constraints on the foreign exchange reserves of both Russia and India have been tested by 
recent economic crises. India’s economic crisis in 2013 triggered a protracted depreciation of 
the rupee that forced the Reserve Bank of India to intervene in currency markets over a 
period of months, and deplete its foreign exchange reserves, in order to smooth the 
depreciation. e Russian economic crisis that commenced in 2014 is still unfolding: capital 
ight in 2014 was estimated by the Central Bank of Russia at US$ 128 billion (e Moscow 
Times, November 10, 2014). e Central Bank is estimated to have used up US$ 80 billion 
of its foreign exchange reserves to intervene to stabilise the sharp depreciation of the rouble 
in 2014 (Reuters News, December 17, 2014). Total foreign exchange reserves are estimated 
to have declined from US$ 510 billion at the end of 2013 to US$ 416 billion by 
mid-December 2014. 
On the other hand, China’s capacity to intervene to stabilise global crises could increase 
signicantly if China manages to introduce full currency convertibility and establish the yuan 
as a global reserve currency. But this is still a long-term goal. 
CONCLUSION.
e developing countries’ long-simmering discontent over the Bretton Woods nancial 
architecture, notably the allocation of voting rights, has resulted in a revolution in global 
development nance that is being led by China. 
China’s rapid economic ascent over the last two decades has led to its having become the 
world’s second largest economy. In the process it has acquired the capacity to act as the 
nancial mainstay of a number of new initiatives for development nancing which can be led 
by developing countries.
warted in playing the leading decision-making role in the IMF and World Bank that it 
deserves, China has instead led the creation of new multilateral development nance 
institutions governed by the developing countries. China is using its vast reserves to lend 
nancial strength to these institutions, although other developing countries are also 
providing capital.
e NDB, AIIB and Silk Road Fund combined bear potential to signicantly increase the 
total multilateral nancing available for economic development in the medium-term, and 
will give developing countries a greater voice in governing global development nance in the 
next decade and beyond.
For the present, however, the capacity of the BRICS and other developing countries to 
intervene in nancial crisis prevention and resolution remains limited due to constraints on 
the foreign exchange reserves of most large developing countries, with the possible exception 
of China. 
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it positions itself within the institutional membership as primus inter pares rather than the 
dominant shareholder driving all decision-making.
irdly, these new development institutions will be an important counterbalance to the 
political weight of the West, giving China a greater voice in global development nance. is 
will become more important politically and economically for China as it becomes the world’s 
largest economy, given that its participation in the World Bank and IMF belie its stature in 
the global economy. 
THE CHALLENGES AHEAD.
e New Development Bank and the AIIB and Silk Road Fund will face considerable 
hurdles, not least of which are the crafting of an ecient governance- and a world-class 
prudential regulatory structure that can avoid the pitfalls of overt politicisation of the new 
institutions. However, with the correct design, the BRICS’ New Development Bank could 
become an important new lender addressing the economic development and infrastructure 
nancing needs of developing countries worldwide. e establishment of the BRICS’ Bank 
at the same time as the AIIB and Silk Road Fund has the potential to signicantly reshape the 
global nancial architecture of development nance.
e governance of the new multilateral nance institutions is very much under scrutiny. To 
a large extent, this reects international perceptions about issues such as corruption in 
developing countries, with the BRICS countries still poorly perceived by international 
standards. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, which ranks 175 
countries, in 2014 had South Africa the highest ranked amongst the BRICS, at 67th, with 
Brazil in 69th place, India 85th, China 100th and Russia 136th. is is on an international 
ranking spectrum in which Denmark was 1st and North Korea and Somalia were ranked 
equally last, at 174th.
A key challenge for the founding countries of the NDB, AIIB and Silk Road Fund will be to 
establish governance structures and decision-making systems having a high degree of 
transparency, integrity, and independence from political inuence in making lending 
decisions.  
Well-established international best practices for governance of nancial institutions exist 
already, and the BRICS central banks as well as other central banks from developing 
We remain deeply disappointed with the continued delay in progressing the IMF quota and 
governance reforms agreed in 2010 and the 15th General Review of Quotas, including a new quota 
formula. Recognising the importance of these reforms for the credibility, legitimacy and eectiveness 
of the IMF, we rearm that their earliest implementation remains our highest priority for the Fund. 
(Communiqué of the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting, Paragraph 9.)
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Poor’s gave the World Bank an AAA foreign currency credit rating in its April 2014 report, 
and Moody’s gave it an Aaa long-term issuer credit rating in January 2014. e World Bank’s 
strong credit ratings from international rating agencies, combined with its extremely sound 
nancial management and liquidity position, give it excellent access to international capital 
markets for its programs.
In comparison, the NDB will probably have a less favourable nancial prole in the view of 
international capital markets, due to the smaller number of government shareholders and 
their lower sovereign credit ratings in comparison to the major shareholders of the World 
Bank. In addition, the nancial governance and loan portfolio of the NDB will not have an 
established track record to begin with, which will also lend it a less favourable credit rating in 
international nancial markets, and make the cost of borrowing higher.
On the other hand, the NDB is likely to benet from its access to funding from the 
state-owned banks of the BRICS countries, notably Chinese state-owned banks, which could 
provide a very large potential source of nancing for the NDB.
Stephany Grith-Jones, the eminent professor of development economics at Columbia 
University, has recently estimated that, given initial capital of US$ 100 billion, the NDB 
could be lending up to US$ 34 billion annually in 20 years’ time (UNCTAD Discussion 
Paper No. 215, April 2014); which is roughly equivalent to the current annual lending of the 
World Bank.
e exact annual lending levels of the NDB will be determined by a complex mix of factors, 
but the key point is that the governance structure of the NDB does allow for the future 
growth of the Chinese and Indian economies to be readily matched by increased capital 
subscriptions to the NDB. If the total size of the Chinese and Indian economies does indeed 
reach 25% of world GDP by 2025, as IHS long-term projections indicate, this would result 
in very sizeable increases in the NDB’s total capitalisation and in its annual lending to 
developing countries.
CHINA’S PARALLEL INITIATIVES.
China has launched other initiatives to expand infrastructure nancing for developing 
countries in Asia. In October 2014, 21 Asian countries agreed to establish a new Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) for which China will provide up to 50% of the initial 
capital. In November 2014 at the APEC Summit, President Xi also announced the creation 
of the new Silk Road Fund to improve connectivity in Asia, for which China will provide 
US$ 40 billion of capital.
China is uniquely positioned amongst large emerging markets to be capable of funding 
signicant development nance initiatives like the NDB, with foreign exchange reserves 
estimated at US$ 3.8 trillion as at December 2014. Recognising that such initiatives will 
strengthen its political and economic ties with other developing nations, China has now 
begun to exercise more signicant leadership in global development nance. In addition to 
the NDB in July 2014, China has led an initiative to create an Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB), of which the Memorandum of Understanding was signed by 21 
Asian countries on October 24th 2014. e AIIB had initial authorised capital of US$ 100 
billion, with subscribed capital likely to be around US$ 50 billion. China has stated its 
willingness to provide up to 50% of the initial capital for the AIIB. e headquarters of the 
AIIB will be located in Beijing.
e AIIB has raised concerns in some quarters about a potential rivalry with the World Bank 
or the Asian Development Bank, with some major Asia-Pacic countries having remained on 
the sidelines. For many Asian developing countries, however, the AIIB is a much-needed 
additional source of infrastructure nance, and the Chinese initiative has been warmly 
welcomed by many of them.
Like the NDB, the AIIB creates a mechanism for China and other developing countries to 
reshape the global nancial architecture in development nance. China is redoubling its 
eorts to expand its role in international development nance by committing US$ 40 billion 
to a new Silk Road Fund that is to nance infrastructure connectivity in emerging Asia. 
China made the announcement at the November 2014 APEC Leaders’ Summit in Beijing.
 
From the Chinese perspective, the NDB, AIIB and Silk Road Fund achieve a number of 
strategic objectives. Firstly, they provide developing countries a source of development 
nancing that is not under the dominion and tutelage of the Bretton Woods institutions with 
their lending conditionality and their one-sided governing mechanisms.
Secondly, China will be the key source of capital for these new institutions, which from a 
geopolitical perspective extends China’s inuence amongst developing countries, even while 
e Fortaleza Declaration claimed that the NDB will strengthen co-operation among the 
BRICS, and also supplement the work of multilateral and regional nancial institutions in 
global development. e Declaration pointedly added that the BRICS members were 
“disappointed and seriously concerned” that the 2010 IMF reforms had still not been 
implemented, and that the IMF governing structures needed to be modernised to reect the 
reality of emerging markets and developing countries.
e genesis of the NDB has at its core the determination of the BRICS to reshape the 
international nancial architecture to reect their growing economic weight (though they 
have averred their intention to co-operate with existing multilateral and regional nancial 
institutions). e NDB constitutes a dynamic mechanism for achieving this outside the 
Bretton Woods framework, while at the same time oering considerable exibility for the 
BRICS and other developing countries to expand their subscribed capital in the NDB as the 
weight of their own economies increases in the global economy. In contrast, this has proven 
very dicult to do within the Bretton Woods governance structures.
SIZE OF CAPITAL OF THE NDB.
While the initial capital for the NDB is to be provided in equal shares by the ve BRICS 
countries, the initial capital of US$ 100 billion for the CRA will be underwritten in greater 
share by China, which will provide US$ 41 billion of it. With foreign exchange reserves of 
US$ 3.8 trillion, the depth of China’s nancial strength will be the key underpinning of the 
NDB and CRA, as well as a potential source of considerable replenishment capital as the 
NDB and CRA commence operations. e important role China plays in the NDB is 
reected in the decision to locate its headquarters in Shanghai.
e initial capital of the NDB is not necessarily limited to the BRICS’ US$ 50 billion, as 
other developing countries will be invited to join and subscribe capital to the NDB. If the 
NDB is able to attract signicant subscribed capital from other sovereign states in addition 
to the BRICS, it would considerably increase the amount of total development nance that 
the NDB is able to provide. By way of comparison, as at June 2014, the total subscribed 
capital of the World Bank was US$ 233 billion, with paid-in capital of US$ 14.4 billion and 
Total Shareholder’s Equity of US$ 39 billion.
One of the strengths of the World Bank is its credit rating, reecting its sound nancial 
position as well as the strength and diversity of its government shareholders. Standard and 
TABLE 1.  BRICS VOTING RIGHTS IN THE IMF COMPARED TO GDP.
(GDP share measured in nominal US Dollar terms; IMF Voting Rights as of August 2014)
   % Share of IMF Voting Rights  % Share of World GDP
China   3.81      12.4
India   2.34      2.6
Russia   2.39      2.8
Brazil   1.72      3.0
South Africa  0.78      0.5
TOTAL  11.04      21.2
Sources: IMF; IHS
With China and India having grown more rapidly than the US and Europe for decades and 
projected to continue to do so over the next two decades, the disproportion of the BRICS 
share of IMF voting rights compared to their share of world GDP can only widen unless 
substantial reforms are made to the governance and voting rights structures of the Bretton 
Woods institutions. 
Based on IHS’ long-term projections of world GDP, China will be the world’s largest 
economy by 2025, when it will account for 19.9% of world GDP, while India is projected to 
account for 5.5%. e Asian BRICS alone will thus have over 25% of world GDP, compared 
to their combined IMF voting rights total of 6.15% at present. Unless there is far more rapid 
progress in IMF voting right reforms than is currently evident, the Asian BRICS will 
confront a major asymmetry between their weight in the global economy and their role in the 
governance of the IMF.
Equally provocative to the developing nations in regard to the governance of the Bretton 
Woods institutions is the agreement between the US and Europe that the Managing Director 
of the IMF should be European and the President of the World Bank should be American. 
is convention has been adhered to since the foundation of the IMF and World Bank; no 
developing country national has ever led either multilateral institution in the last 70 years. 
President Obama attempted to make amends for the unfairness of this state of aairs by 
nominating a US citizen of Korean ethnicity to become the World Bank President in 2012. 
But this does not fundamentally redress the gross imbalance between the BRICS’ weight in 
the global economy and their voting rights in the Bretton Woods institutions. e concerns 
amongst developing countries about the delay to IMF quota and governance reforms were 
reected in the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting held in Istanbul 
on 9-10 February 2015. is was a key issue highlighted in the G20 Communiqué released 
after the meeting:
RESHAPING THE FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE.
eir eorts to reshape the Bretton Woods governance structures having essentially come to 
naught, one initiatives that has been under discussion since 2012 amongst the BRIC 
countries was the establishment of their own development bank. A resolution to do just that 
was formally approved by the BRICS at their summit in South Africa in 2013, and detailed 
planning was subsequently undertaken in the lead-up to the 6th BRICS Summit in Fortaleza 
in July 2014. ere and then, the formal decision was taken to set up the “New Development 
Bank” (NDB) which had initial authorised capital of US$ 100 billion and initial subscribed 
capital of US$ 50 billion, along with a Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) with capital 
of US$ 100 billion.
An Inter-Governmental Agreement was signed on 15 July 2014 by Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa to establish the NDB and CRA. e initial subscribed capital of the 
NDB will be provided in equal shares by the ve founding member countries.
e remit of the NDB will be to nance infrastructure and sustainable development projects, 
while the CRA is to be an external account support facility to help developing countries 
manage balance of payments crises. 
e NDB is set up to provide loans, equity participation, guarantees and other nancial 
instruments. e BRICS members also intend the NDB to have discretion to co-operate 
with international organisations, as well as public and private organisations, particularly with 
international nancial institutions and national development banks.
 
countries have considerable experience in these principles through their regulatory and 
supervisory responsibilities in their domestic banking systems. ere is enough capacity and 
knowledge within the BRICS to craft best practice standards for the NDB and the other 
institutions now being created.
Another major challenge to the BRICS and other developing countries in attempting to 
reshape the international nancial architecture stems from signicant foreign exchange 
reserve constraints, which most developing countries still face. NDB, AIIB and Silk Road 
Fund bear potential to rapidly transform global development nance. On the other hand, it 
is unlikely the developing countries as a group can play a signicant role in international 
crisis prevention and resolution for developing countries in the near to medium term, with 
even some of the largest developing countries facing considerable challenges due to volatile 
international capital ows. 
e constraints on the foreign exchange reserves of both Russia and India have been tested by 
recent economic crises. India’s economic crisis in 2013 triggered a protracted depreciation of 
the rupee that forced the Reserve Bank of India to intervene in currency markets over a 
period of months, and deplete its foreign exchange reserves, in order to smooth the 
depreciation. e Russian economic crisis that commenced in 2014 is still unfolding: capital 
ight in 2014 was estimated by the Central Bank of Russia at US$ 128 billion (e Moscow 
Times, November 10, 2014). e Central Bank is estimated to have used up US$ 80 billion 
of its foreign exchange reserves to intervene to stabilise the sharp depreciation of the rouble 
in 2014 (Reuters News, December 17, 2014). Total foreign exchange reserves are estimated 
to have declined from US$ 510 billion at the end of 2013 to US$ 416 billion by 
mid-December 2014. 
On the other hand, China’s capacity to intervene to stabilise global crises could increase 
signicantly if China manages to introduce full currency convertibility and establish the yuan 
as a global reserve currency. But this is still a long-term goal. 
CONCLUSION.
e developing countries’ long-simmering discontent over the Bretton Woods nancial 
architecture, notably the allocation of voting rights, has resulted in a revolution in global 
development nance that is being led by China. 
China’s rapid economic ascent over the last two decades has led to its having become the 
world’s second largest economy. In the process it has acquired the capacity to act as the 
nancial mainstay of a number of new initiatives for development nancing which can be led 
by developing countries.
warted in playing the leading decision-making role in the IMF and World Bank that it 
deserves, China has instead led the creation of new multilateral development nance 
institutions governed by the developing countries. China is using its vast reserves to lend 
nancial strength to these institutions, although other developing countries are also 
providing capital.
e NDB, AIIB and Silk Road Fund combined bear potential to signicantly increase the 
total multilateral nancing available for economic development in the medium-term, and 
will give developing countries a greater voice in governing global development nance in the 
next decade and beyond.
For the present, however, the capacity of the BRICS and other developing countries to 
intervene in nancial crisis prevention and resolution remains limited due to constraints on 
the foreign exchange reserves of most large developing countries, with the possible exception 
of China. 
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it positions itself within the institutional membership as primus inter pares rather than the 
dominant shareholder driving all decision-making.
irdly, these new development institutions will be an important counterbalance to the 
political weight of the West, giving China a greater voice in global development nance. is 
will become more important politically and economically for China as it becomes the world’s 
largest economy, given that its participation in the World Bank and IMF belie its stature in 
the global economy. 
THE CHALLENGES AHEAD.
e New Development Bank and the AIIB and Silk Road Fund will face considerable 
hurdles, not least of which are the crafting of an ecient governance- and a world-class 
prudential regulatory structure that can avoid the pitfalls of overt politicisation of the new 
institutions. However, with the correct design, the BRICS’ New Development Bank could 
become an important new lender addressing the economic development and infrastructure 
nancing needs of developing countries worldwide. e establishment of the BRICS’ Bank 
at the same time as the AIIB and Silk Road Fund has the potential to signicantly reshape the 
global nancial architecture of development nance.
e governance of the new multilateral nance institutions is very much under scrutiny. To 
a large extent, this reects international perceptions about issues such as corruption in 
developing countries, with the BRICS countries still poorly perceived by international 
standards. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, which ranks 175 
countries, in 2014 had South Africa the highest ranked amongst the BRICS, at 67th, with 
Brazil in 69th place, India 85th, China 100th and Russia 136th. is is on an international 
ranking spectrum in which Denmark was 1st and North Korea and Somalia were ranked 
equally last, at 174th.
A key challenge for the founding countries of the NDB, AIIB and Silk Road Fund will be to 
establish governance structures and decision-making systems having a high degree of 
transparency, integrity, and independence from political inuence in making lending 
decisions.  
Well-established international best practices for governance of nancial institutions exist 
already, and the BRICS central banks as well as other central banks from developing 
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Poor’s gave the World Bank an AAA foreign currency credit rating in its April 2014 report, 
and Moody’s gave it an Aaa long-term issuer credit rating in January 2014. e World Bank’s 
strong credit ratings from international rating agencies, combined with its extremely sound 
nancial management and liquidity position, give it excellent access to international capital 
markets for its programs.
In comparison, the NDB will probably have a less favourable nancial prole in the view of 
international capital markets, due to the smaller number of government shareholders and 
their lower sovereign credit ratings in comparison to the major shareholders of the World 
Bank. In addition, the nancial governance and loan portfolio of the NDB will not have an 
established track record to begin with, which will also lend it a less favourable credit rating in 
international nancial markets, and make the cost of borrowing higher.
On the other hand, the NDB is likely to benet from its access to funding from the 
state-owned banks of the BRICS countries, notably Chinese state-owned banks, which could 
provide a very large potential source of nancing for the NDB.
Stephany Grith-Jones, the eminent professor of development economics at Columbia 
University, has recently estimated that, given initial capital of US$ 100 billion, the NDB 
could be lending up to US$ 34 billion annually in 20 years’ time (UNCTAD Discussion 
Paper No. 215, April 2014); which is roughly equivalent to the current annual lending of the 
World Bank.
e exact annual lending levels of the NDB will be determined by a complex mix of factors, 
but the key point is that the governance structure of the NDB does allow for the future 
growth of the Chinese and Indian economies to be readily matched by increased capital 
subscriptions to the NDB. If the total size of the Chinese and Indian economies does indeed 
reach 25% of world GDP by 2025, as IHS long-term projections indicate, this would result 
in very sizeable increases in the NDB’s total capitalisation and in its annual lending to 
developing countries.
CHINA’S PARALLEL INITIATIVES.
China has launched other initiatives to expand infrastructure nancing for developing 
countries in Asia. In October 2014, 21 Asian countries agreed to establish a new Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) for which China will provide up to 50% of the initial 
capital. In November 2014 at the APEC Summit, President Xi also announced the creation 
of the new Silk Road Fund to improve connectivity in Asia, for which China will provide 
US$ 40 billion of capital.
China is uniquely positioned amongst large emerging markets to be capable of funding 
signicant development nance initiatives like the NDB, with foreign exchange reserves 
estimated at US$ 3.8 trillion as at December 2014. Recognising that such initiatives will 
strengthen its political and economic ties with other developing nations, China has now 
begun to exercise more signicant leadership in global development nance. In addition to 
the NDB in July 2014, China has led an initiative to create an Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB), of which the Memorandum of Understanding was signed by 21 
Asian countries on October 24th 2014. e AIIB had initial authorised capital of US$ 100 
billion, with subscribed capital likely to be around US$ 50 billion. China has stated its 
willingness to provide up to 50% of the initial capital for the AIIB. e headquarters of the 
AIIB will be located in Beijing.
e AIIB has raised concerns in some quarters about a potential rivalry with the World Bank 
or the Asian Development Bank, with some major Asia-Pacic countries having remained on 
the sidelines. For many Asian developing countries, however, the AIIB is a much-needed 
additional source of infrastructure nance, and the Chinese initiative has been warmly 
welcomed by many of them.
Like the NDB, the AIIB creates a mechanism for China and other developing countries to 
reshape the global nancial architecture in development nance. China is redoubling its 
eorts to expand its role in international development nance by committing US$ 40 billion 
to a new Silk Road Fund that is to nance infrastructure connectivity in emerging Asia. 
China made the announcement at the November 2014 APEC Leaders’ Summit in Beijing.
 
From the Chinese perspective, the NDB, AIIB and Silk Road Fund achieve a number of 
strategic objectives. Firstly, they provide developing countries a source of development 
nancing that is not under the dominion and tutelage of the Bretton Woods institutions with 
their lending conditionality and their one-sided governing mechanisms.
Secondly, China will be the key source of capital for these new institutions, which from a 
geopolitical perspective extends China’s inuence amongst developing countries, even while 
e Fortaleza Declaration claimed that the NDB will strengthen co-operation among the 
BRICS, and also supplement the work of multilateral and regional nancial institutions in 
global development. e Declaration pointedly added that the BRICS members were 
“disappointed and seriously concerned” that the 2010 IMF reforms had still not been 
implemented, and that the IMF governing structures needed to be modernised to reect the 
reality of emerging markets and developing countries.
e genesis of the NDB has at its core the determination of the BRICS to reshape the 
international nancial architecture to reect their growing economic weight (though they 
have averred their intention to co-operate with existing multilateral and regional nancial 
institutions). e NDB constitutes a dynamic mechanism for achieving this outside the 
Bretton Woods framework, while at the same time oering considerable exibility for the 
BRICS and other developing countries to expand their subscribed capital in the NDB as the 
weight of their own economies increases in the global economy. In contrast, this has proven 
very dicult to do within the Bretton Woods governance structures.
SIZE OF CAPITAL OF THE NDB.
While the initial capital for the NDB is to be provided in equal shares by the ve BRICS 
countries, the initial capital of US$ 100 billion for the CRA will be underwritten in greater 
share by China, which will provide US$ 41 billion of it. With foreign exchange reserves of 
US$ 3.8 trillion, the depth of China’s nancial strength will be the key underpinning of the 
NDB and CRA, as well as a potential source of considerable replenishment capital as the 
NDB and CRA commence operations. e important role China plays in the NDB is 
reected in the decision to locate its headquarters in Shanghai.
e initial capital of the NDB is not necessarily limited to the BRICS’ US$ 50 billion, as 
other developing countries will be invited to join and subscribe capital to the NDB. If the 
NDB is able to attract signicant subscribed capital from other sovereign states in addition 
to the BRICS, it would considerably increase the amount of total development nance that 
the NDB is able to provide. By way of comparison, as at June 2014, the total subscribed 
capital of the World Bank was US$ 233 billion, with paid-in capital of US$ 14.4 billion and 
Total Shareholder’s Equity of US$ 39 billion.
One of the strengths of the World Bank is its credit rating, reecting its sound nancial 
position as well as the strength and diversity of its government shareholders. Standard and 
TABLE 1.  BRICS VOTING RIGHTS IN THE IMF COMPARED TO GDP.
(GDP share measured in nominal US Dollar terms; IMF Voting Rights as of August 2014)
   % Share of IMF Voting Rights  % Share of World GDP
China   3.81      12.4
India   2.34      2.6
Russia   2.39      2.8
Brazil   1.72      3.0
South Africa  0.78      0.5
TOTAL  11.04      21.2
Sources: IMF; IHS
With China and India having grown more rapidly than the US and Europe for decades and 
projected to continue to do so over the next two decades, the disproportion of the BRICS 
share of IMF voting rights compared to their share of world GDP can only widen unless 
substantial reforms are made to the governance and voting rights structures of the Bretton 
Woods institutions. 
Based on IHS’ long-term projections of world GDP, China will be the world’s largest 
economy by 2025, when it will account for 19.9% of world GDP, while India is projected to 
account for 5.5%. e Asian BRICS alone will thus have over 25% of world GDP, compared 
to their combined IMF voting rights total of 6.15% at present. Unless there is far more rapid 
progress in IMF voting right reforms than is currently evident, the Asian BRICS will 
confront a major asymmetry between their weight in the global economy and their role in the 
governance of the IMF.
Equally provocative to the developing nations in regard to the governance of the Bretton 
Woods institutions is the agreement between the US and Europe that the Managing Director 
of the IMF should be European and the President of the World Bank should be American. 
is convention has been adhered to since the foundation of the IMF and World Bank; no 
developing country national has ever led either multilateral institution in the last 70 years. 
President Obama attempted to make amends for the unfairness of this state of aairs by 
nominating a US citizen of Korean ethnicity to become the World Bank President in 2012. 
But this does not fundamentally redress the gross imbalance between the BRICS’ weight in 
the global economy and their voting rights in the Bretton Woods institutions. e concerns 
amongst developing countries about the delay to IMF quota and governance reforms were 
reected in the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting held in Istanbul 
on 9-10 February 2015. is was a key issue highlighted in the G20 Communiqué released 
after the meeting:
RESHAPING THE FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE.
eir eorts to reshape the Bretton Woods governance structures having essentially come to 
naught, one initiatives that has been under discussion since 2012 amongst the BRIC 
countries was the establishment of their own development bank. A resolution to do just that 
was formally approved by the BRICS at their summit in South Africa in 2013, and detailed 
planning was subsequently undertaken in the lead-up to the 6th BRICS Summit in Fortaleza 
in July 2014. ere and then, the formal decision was taken to set up the “New Development 
Bank” (NDB) which had initial authorised capital of US$ 100 billion and initial subscribed 
capital of US$ 50 billion, along with a Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) with capital 
of US$ 100 billion.
An Inter-Governmental Agreement was signed on 15 July 2014 by Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa to establish the NDB and CRA. e initial subscribed capital of the 
NDB will be provided in equal shares by the ve founding member countries.
e remit of the NDB will be to nance infrastructure and sustainable development projects, 
while the CRA is to be an external account support facility to help developing countries 
manage balance of payments crises. 
e NDB is set up to provide loans, equity participation, guarantees and other nancial 
instruments. e BRICS members also intend the NDB to have discretion to co-operate 
with international organisations, as well as public and private organisations, particularly with 
international nancial institutions and national development banks.
 
countries have considerable experience in these principles through their regulatory and 
supervisory responsibilities in their domestic banking systems. ere is enough capacity and 
knowledge within the BRICS to craft best practice standards for the NDB and the other 
institutions now being created.
Another major challenge to the BRICS and other developing countries in attempting to 
reshape the international nancial architecture stems from signicant foreign exchange 
reserve constraints, which most developing countries still face. NDB, AIIB and Silk Road 
Fund bear potential to rapidly transform global development nance. On the other hand, it 
is unlikely the developing countries as a group can play a signicant role in international 
crisis prevention and resolution for developing countries in the near to medium term, with 
even some of the largest developing countries facing considerable challenges due to volatile 
international capital ows. 
e constraints on the foreign exchange reserves of both Russia and India have been tested by 
recent economic crises. India’s economic crisis in 2013 triggered a protracted depreciation of 
the rupee that forced the Reserve Bank of India to intervene in currency markets over a 
period of months, and deplete its foreign exchange reserves, in order to smooth the 
depreciation. e Russian economic crisis that commenced in 2014 is still unfolding: capital 
ight in 2014 was estimated by the Central Bank of Russia at US$ 128 billion (e Moscow 
Times, November 10, 2014). e Central Bank is estimated to have used up US$ 80 billion 
of its foreign exchange reserves to intervene to stabilise the sharp depreciation of the rouble 
in 2014 (Reuters News, December 17, 2014). Total foreign exchange reserves are estimated 
to have declined from US$ 510 billion at the end of 2013 to US$ 416 billion by 
mid-December 2014. 
On the other hand, China’s capacity to intervene to stabilise global crises could increase 
signicantly if China manages to introduce full currency convertibility and establish the yuan 
as a global reserve currency. But this is still a long-term goal. 
CONCLUSION.
e developing countries’ long-simmering discontent over the Bretton Woods nancial 
architecture, notably the allocation of voting rights, has resulted in a revolution in global 
development nance that is being led by China. 
China’s rapid economic ascent over the last two decades has led to its having become the 
world’s second largest economy. In the process it has acquired the capacity to act as the 
nancial mainstay of a number of new initiatives for development nancing which can be led 
by developing countries.
warted in playing the leading decision-making role in the IMF and World Bank that it 
deserves, China has instead led the creation of new multilateral development nance 
institutions governed by the developing countries. China is using its vast reserves to lend 
nancial strength to these institutions, although other developing countries are also 
providing capital.
e NDB, AIIB and Silk Road Fund combined bear potential to signicantly increase the 
total multilateral nancing available for economic development in the medium-term, and 
will give developing countries a greater voice in governing global development nance in the 
next decade and beyond.
For the present, however, the capacity of the BRICS and other developing countries to 
intervene in nancial crisis prevention and resolution remains limited due to constraints on 
the foreign exchange reserves of most large developing countries, with the possible exception 
of China. 
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it positions itself within the institutional membership as primus inter pares rather than the 
dominant shareholder driving all decision-making.
irdly, these new development institutions will be an important counterbalance to the 
political weight of the West, giving China a greater voice in global development nance. is 
will become more important politically and economically for China as it becomes the world’s 
largest economy, given that its participation in the World Bank and IMF belie its stature in 
the global economy. 
THE CHALLENGES AHEAD.
e New Development Bank and the AIIB and Silk Road Fund will face considerable 
hurdles, not least of which are the crafting of an ecient governance- and a world-class 
prudential regulatory structure that can avoid the pitfalls of overt politicisation of the new 
institutions. However, with the correct design, the BRICS’ New Development Bank could 
become an important new lender addressing the economic development and infrastructure 
nancing needs of developing countries worldwide. e establishment of the BRICS’ Bank 
at the same time as the AIIB and Silk Road Fund has the potential to signicantly reshape the 
global nancial architecture of development nance.
e governance of the new multilateral nance institutions is very much under scrutiny. To 
a large extent, this reects international perceptions about issues such as corruption in 
developing countries, with the BRICS countries still poorly perceived by international 
standards. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, which ranks 175 
countries, in 2014 had South Africa the highest ranked amongst the BRICS, at 67th, with 
Brazil in 69th place, India 85th, China 100th and Russia 136th. is is on an international 
ranking spectrum in which Denmark was 1st and North Korea and Somalia were ranked 
equally last, at 174th.
A key challenge for the founding countries of the NDB, AIIB and Silk Road Fund will be to 
establish governance structures and decision-making systems having a high degree of 
transparency, integrity, and independence from political inuence in making lending 
decisions.  
Well-established international best practices for governance of nancial institutions exist 
already, and the BRICS central banks as well as other central banks from developing 
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Poor’s gave the World Bank an AAA foreign currency credit rating in its April 2014 report, 
and Moody’s gave it an Aaa long-term issuer credit rating in January 2014. e World Bank’s 
strong credit ratings from international rating agencies, combined with its extremely sound 
nancial management and liquidity position, give it excellent access to international capital 
markets for its programs.
In comparison, the NDB will probably have a less favourable nancial prole in the view of 
international capital markets, due to the smaller number of government shareholders and 
their lower sovereign credit ratings in comparison to the major shareholders of the World 
Bank. In addition, the nancial governance and loan portfolio of the NDB will not have an 
established track record to begin with, which will also lend it a less favourable credit rating in 
international nancial markets, and make the cost of borrowing higher.
On the other hand, the NDB is likely to benet from its access to funding from the 
state-owned banks of the BRICS countries, notably Chinese state-owned banks, which could 
provide a very large potential source of nancing for the NDB.
Stephany Grith-Jones, the eminent professor of development economics at Columbia 
University, has recently estimated that, given initial capital of US$ 100 billion, the NDB 
could be lending up to US$ 34 billion annually in 20 years’ time (UNCTAD Discussion 
Paper No. 215, April 2014); which is roughly equivalent to the current annual lending of the 
World Bank.
e exact annual lending levels of the NDB will be determined by a complex mix of factors, 
but the key point is that the governance structure of the NDB does allow for the future 
growth of the Chinese and Indian economies to be readily matched by increased capital 
subscriptions to the NDB. If the total size of the Chinese and Indian economies does indeed 
reach 25% of world GDP by 2025, as IHS long-term projections indicate, this would result 
in very sizeable increases in the NDB’s total capitalisation and in its annual lending to 
developing countries.
CHINA’S PARALLEL INITIATIVES.
China has launched other initiatives to expand infrastructure nancing for developing 
countries in Asia. In October 2014, 21 Asian countries agreed to establish a new Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) for which China will provide up to 50% of the initial 
capital. In November 2014 at the APEC Summit, President Xi also announced the creation 
of the new Silk Road Fund to improve connectivity in Asia, for which China will provide 
US$ 40 billion of capital.
China is uniquely positioned amongst large emerging markets to be capable of funding 
signicant development nance initiatives like the NDB, with foreign exchange reserves 
estimated at US$ 3.8 trillion as at December 2014. Recognising that such initiatives will 
strengthen its political and economic ties with other developing nations, China has now 
begun to exercise more signicant leadership in global development nance. In addition to 
the NDB in July 2014, China has led an initiative to create an Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB), of which the Memorandum of Understanding was signed by 21 
Asian countries on October 24th 2014. e AIIB had initial authorised capital of US$ 100 
billion, with subscribed capital likely to be around US$ 50 billion. China has stated its 
willingness to provide up to 50% of the initial capital for the AIIB. e headquarters of the 
AIIB will be located in Beijing.
e AIIB has raised concerns in some quarters about a potential rivalry with the World Bank 
or the Asian Development Bank, with some major Asia-Pacic countries having remained on 
the sidelines. For many Asian developing countries, however, the AIIB is a much-needed 
additional source of infrastructure nance, and the Chinese initiative has been warmly 
welcomed by many of them.
Like the NDB, the AIIB creates a mechanism for China and other developing countries to 
reshape the global nancial architecture in development nance. China is redoubling its 
eorts to expand its role in international development nance by committing US$ 40 billion 
to a new Silk Road Fund that is to nance infrastructure connectivity in emerging Asia. 
China made the announcement at the November 2014 APEC Leaders’ Summit in Beijing.
 
From the Chinese perspective, the NDB, AIIB and Silk Road Fund achieve a number of 
strategic objectives. Firstly, they provide developing countries a source of development 
nancing that is not under the dominion and tutelage of the Bretton Woods institutions with 
their lending conditionality and their one-sided governing mechanisms.
Secondly, China will be the key source of capital for these new institutions, which from a 
geopolitical perspective extends China’s inuence amongst developing countries, even while 
e Fortaleza Declaration claimed that the NDB will strengthen co-operation among the 
BRICS, and also supplement the work of multilateral and regional nancial institutions in 
global development. e Declaration pointedly added that the BRICS members were 
“disappointed and seriously concerned” that the 2010 IMF reforms had still not been 
implemented, and that the IMF governing structures needed to be modernised to reect the 
reality of emerging markets and developing countries.
e genesis of the NDB has at its core the determination of the BRICS to reshape the 
international nancial architecture to reect their growing economic weight (though they 
have averred their intention to co-operate with existing multilateral and regional nancial 
institutions). e NDB constitutes a dynamic mechanism for achieving this outside the 
Bretton Woods framework, while at the same time oering considerable exibility for the 
BRICS and other developing countries to expand their subscribed capital in the NDB as the 
weight of their own economies increases in the global economy. In contrast, this has proven 
very dicult to do within the Bretton Woods governance structures.
SIZE OF CAPITAL OF THE NDB.
While the initial capital for the NDB is to be provided in equal shares by the ve BRICS 
countries, the initial capital of US$ 100 billion for the CRA will be underwritten in greater 
share by China, which will provide US$ 41 billion of it. With foreign exchange reserves of 
US$ 3.8 trillion, the depth of China’s nancial strength will be the key underpinning of the 
NDB and CRA, as well as a potential source of considerable replenishment capital as the 
NDB and CRA commence operations. e important role China plays in the NDB is 
reected in the decision to locate its headquarters in Shanghai.
e initial capital of the NDB is not necessarily limited to the BRICS’ US$ 50 billion, as 
other developing countries will be invited to join and subscribe capital to the NDB. If the 
NDB is able to attract signicant subscribed capital from other sovereign states in addition 
to the BRICS, it would considerably increase the amount of total development nance that 
the NDB is able to provide. By way of comparison, as at June 2014, the total subscribed 
capital of the World Bank was US$ 233 billion, with paid-in capital of US$ 14.4 billion and 
Total Shareholder’s Equity of US$ 39 billion.
One of the strengths of the World Bank is its credit rating, reecting its sound nancial 
position as well as the strength and diversity of its government shareholders. Standard and 
TABLE 1.  BRICS VOTING RIGHTS IN THE IMF COMPARED TO GDP.
(GDP share measured in nominal US Dollar terms; IMF Voting Rights as of August 2014)
   % Share of IMF Voting Rights  % Share of World GDP
China   3.81      12.4
India   2.34      2.6
Russia   2.39      2.8
Brazil   1.72      3.0
South Africa  0.78      0.5
TOTAL  11.04      21.2
Sources: IMF; IHS
With China and India having grown more rapidly than the US and Europe for decades and 
projected to continue to do so over the next two decades, the disproportion of the BRICS 
share of IMF voting rights compared to their share of world GDP can only widen unless 
substantial reforms are made to the governance and voting rights structures of the Bretton 
Woods institutions. 
Based on IHS’ long-term projections of world GDP, China will be the world’s largest 
economy by 2025, when it will account for 19.9% of world GDP, while India is projected to 
account for 5.5%. e Asian BRICS alone will thus have over 25% of world GDP, compared 
to their combined IMF voting rights total of 6.15% at present. Unless there is far more rapid 
progress in IMF voting right reforms than is currently evident, the Asian BRICS will 
confront a major asymmetry between their weight in the global economy and their role in the 
governance of the IMF.
Equally provocative to the developing nations in regard to the governance of the Bretton 
Woods institutions is the agreement between the US and Europe that the Managing Director 
of the IMF should be European and the President of the World Bank should be American. 
is convention has been adhered to since the foundation of the IMF and World Bank; no 
developing country national has ever led either multilateral institution in the last 70 years. 
President Obama attempted to make amends for the unfairness of this state of aairs by 
nominating a US citizen of Korean ethnicity to become the World Bank President in 2012. 
But this does not fundamentally redress the gross imbalance between the BRICS’ weight in 
the global economy and their voting rights in the Bretton Woods institutions. e concerns 
amongst developing countries about the delay to IMF quota and governance reforms were 
reected in the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting held in Istanbul 
on 9-10 February 2015. is was a key issue highlighted in the G20 Communiqué released 
after the meeting:
RESHAPING THE FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE.
eir eorts to reshape the Bretton Woods governance structures having essentially come to 
naught, one initiatives that has been under discussion since 2012 amongst the BRIC 
countries was the establishment of their own development bank. A resolution to do just that 
was formally approved by the BRICS at their summit in South Africa in 2013, and detailed 
planning was subsequently undertaken in the lead-up to the 6th BRICS Summit in Fortaleza 
in July 2014. ere and then, the formal decision was taken to set up the “New Development 
Bank” (NDB) which had initial authorised capital of US$ 100 billion and initial subscribed 
capital of US$ 50 billion, along with a Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) with capital 
of US$ 100 billion.
An Inter-Governmental Agreement was signed on 15 July 2014 by Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa to establish the NDB and CRA. e initial subscribed capital of the 
NDB will be provided in equal shares by the ve founding member countries.
e remit of the NDB will be to nance infrastructure and sustainable development projects, 
while the CRA is to be an external account support facility to help developing countries 
manage balance of payments crises. 
e NDB is set up to provide loans, equity participation, guarantees and other nancial 
instruments. e BRICS members also intend the NDB to have discretion to co-operate 
with international organisations, as well as public and private organisations, particularly with 
international nancial institutions and national development banks.
 
countries have considerable experience in these principles through their regulatory and 
supervisory responsibilities in their domestic banking systems. ere is enough capacity and 
knowledge within the BRICS to craft best practice standards for the NDB and the other 
institutions now being created.
Another major challenge to the BRICS and other developing countries in attempting to 
reshape the international nancial architecture stems from signicant foreign exchange 
reserve constraints, which most developing countries still face. NDB, AIIB and Silk Road 
Fund bear potential to rapidly transform global development nance. On the other hand, it 
is unlikely the developing countries as a group can play a signicant role in international 
crisis prevention and resolution for developing countries in the near to medium term, with 
even some of the largest developing countries facing considerable challenges due to volatile 
international capital ows. 
e constraints on the foreign exchange reserves of both Russia and India have been tested by 
recent economic crises. India’s economic crisis in 2013 triggered a protracted depreciation of 
the rupee that forced the Reserve Bank of India to intervene in currency markets over a 
period of months, and deplete its foreign exchange reserves, in order to smooth the 
depreciation. e Russian economic crisis that commenced in 2014 is still unfolding: capital 
ight in 2014 was estimated by the Central Bank of Russia at US$ 128 billion (e Moscow 
Times, November 10, 2014). e Central Bank is estimated to have used up US$ 80 billion 
of its foreign exchange reserves to intervene to stabilise the sharp depreciation of the rouble 
in 2014 (Reuters News, December 17, 2014). Total foreign exchange reserves are estimated 
to have declined from US$ 510 billion at the end of 2013 to US$ 416 billion by 
mid-December 2014. 
On the other hand, China’s capacity to intervene to stabilise global crises could increase 
signicantly if China manages to introduce full currency convertibility and establish the yuan 
as a global reserve currency. But this is still a long-term goal. 
CONCLUSION.
e developing countries’ long-simmering discontent over the Bretton Woods nancial 
architecture, notably the allocation of voting rights, has resulted in a revolution in global 
development nance that is being led by China. 
China’s rapid economic ascent over the last two decades has led to its having become the 
world’s second largest economy. In the process it has acquired the capacity to act as the 
nancial mainstay of a number of new initiatives for development nancing which can be led 
by developing countries.
warted in playing the leading decision-making role in the IMF and World Bank that it 
deserves, China has instead led the creation of new multilateral development nance 
institutions governed by the developing countries. China is using its vast reserves to lend 
nancial strength to these institutions, although other developing countries are also 
providing capital.
e NDB, AIIB and Silk Road Fund combined bear potential to signicantly increase the 
total multilateral nancing available for economic development in the medium-term, and 
will give developing countries a greater voice in governing global development nance in the 
next decade and beyond.
For the present, however, the capacity of the BRICS and other developing countries to 
intervene in nancial crisis prevention and resolution remains limited due to constraints on 
the foreign exchange reserves of most large developing countries, with the possible exception 
of China. 
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it positions itself within the institutional membership as primus inter pares rather than the 
dominant shareholder driving all decision-making.
irdly, these new development institutions will be an important counterbalance to the 
political weight of the West, giving China a greater voice in global development nance. is 
will become more important politically and economically for China as it becomes the world’s 
largest economy, given that its participation in the World Bank and IMF belie its stature in 
the global economy. 
THE CHALLENGES AHEAD.
e New Development Bank and the AIIB and Silk Road Fund will face considerable 
hurdles, not least of which are the crafting of an ecient governance- and a world-class 
prudential regulatory structure that can avoid the pitfalls of overt politicisation of the new 
institutions. However, with the correct design, the BRICS’ New Development Bank could 
become an important new lender addressing the economic development and infrastructure 
nancing needs of developing countries worldwide. e establishment of the BRICS’ Bank 
at the same time as the AIIB and Silk Road Fund has the potential to signicantly reshape the 
global nancial architecture of development nance.
e governance of the new multilateral nance institutions is very much under scrutiny. To 
a large extent, this reects international perceptions about issues such as corruption in 
developing countries, with the BRICS countries still poorly perceived by international 
standards. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, which ranks 175 
countries, in 2014 had South Africa the highest ranked amongst the BRICS, at 67th, with 
Brazil in 69th place, India 85th, China 100th and Russia 136th. is is on an international 
ranking spectrum in which Denmark was 1st and North Korea and Somalia were ranked 
equally last, at 174th.
A key challenge for the founding countries of the NDB, AIIB and Silk Road Fund will be to 
establish governance structures and decision-making systems having a high degree of 
transparency, integrity, and independence from political inuence in making lending 
decisions.  
Well-established international best practices for governance of nancial institutions exist 
already, and the BRICS central banks as well as other central banks from developing 
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Poor’s gave the World Bank an AAA foreign currency credit rating in its April 2014 report, 
and Moody’s gave it an Aaa long-term issuer credit rating in January 2014. e World Bank’s 
strong credit ratings from international rating agencies, combined with its extremely sound 
nancial management and liquidity position, give it excellent access to international capital 
markets for its programs.
In comparison, the NDB will probably have a less favourable nancial prole in the view of 
international capital markets, due to the smaller number of government shareholders and 
their lower sovereign credit ratings in comparison to the major shareholders of the World 
Bank. In addition, the nancial governance and loan portfolio of the NDB will not have an 
established track record to begin with, which will also lend it a less favourable credit rating in 
international nancial markets, and make the cost of borrowing higher.
On the other hand, the NDB is likely to benet from its access to funding from the 
state-owned banks of the BRICS countries, notably Chinese state-owned banks, which could 
provide a very large potential source of nancing for the NDB.
Stephany Grith-Jones, the eminent professor of development economics at Columbia 
University, has recently estimated that, given initial capital of US$ 100 billion, the NDB 
could be lending up to US$ 34 billion annually in 20 years’ time (UNCTAD Discussion 
Paper No. 215, April 2014); which is roughly equivalent to the current annual lending of the 
World Bank.
e exact annual lending levels of the NDB will be determined by a complex mix of factors, 
but the key point is that the governance structure of the NDB does allow for the future 
growth of the Chinese and Indian economies to be readily matched by increased capital 
subscriptions to the NDB. If the total size of the Chinese and Indian economies does indeed 
reach 25% of world GDP by 2025, as IHS long-term projections indicate, this would result 
in very sizeable increases in the NDB’s total capitalisation and in its annual lending to 
developing countries.
CHINA’S PARALLEL INITIATIVES.
China has launched other initiatives to expand infrastructure nancing for developing 
countries in Asia. In October 2014, 21 Asian countries agreed to establish a new Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) for which China will provide up to 50% of the initial 
capital. In November 2014 at the APEC Summit, President Xi also announced the creation 
of the new Silk Road Fund to improve connectivity in Asia, for which China will provide 
US$ 40 billion of capital.
China is uniquely positioned amongst large emerging markets to be capable of funding 
signicant development nance initiatives like the NDB, with foreign exchange reserves 
estimated at US$ 3.8 trillion as at December 2014. Recognising that such initiatives will 
strengthen its political and economic ties with other developing nations, China has now 
begun to exercise more signicant leadership in global development nance. In addition to 
the NDB in July 2014, China has led an initiative to create an Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB), of which the Memorandum of Understanding was signed by 21 
Asian countries on October 24th 2014. e AIIB had initial authorised capital of US$ 100 
billion, with subscribed capital likely to be around US$ 50 billion. China has stated its 
willingness to provide up to 50% of the initial capital for the AIIB. e headquarters of the 
AIIB will be located in Beijing.
e AIIB has raised concerns in some quarters about a potential rivalry with the World Bank 
or the Asian Development Bank, with some major Asia-Pacic countries having remained on 
the sidelines. For many Asian developing countries, however, the AIIB is a much-needed 
additional source of infrastructure nance, and the Chinese initiative has been warmly 
welcomed by many of them.
Like the NDB, the AIIB creates a mechanism for China and other developing countries to 
reshape the global nancial architecture in development nance. China is redoubling its 
eorts to expand its role in international development nance by committing US$ 40 billion 
to a new Silk Road Fund that is to nance infrastructure connectivity in emerging Asia. 
China made the announcement at the November 2014 APEC Leaders’ Summit in Beijing.
 
From the Chinese perspective, the NDB, AIIB and Silk Road Fund achieve a number of 
strategic objectives. Firstly, they provide developing countries a source of development 
nancing that is not under the dominion and tutelage of the Bretton Woods institutions with 
their lending conditionality and their one-sided governing mechanisms.
Secondly, China will be the key source of capital for these new institutions, which from a 
geopolitical perspective extends China’s inuence amongst developing countries, even while 
e Fortaleza Declaration claimed that the NDB will strengthen co-operation among the 
BRICS, and also supplement the work of multilateral and regional nancial institutions in 
global development. e Declaration pointedly added that the BRICS members were 
“disappointed and seriously concerned” that the 2010 IMF reforms had still not been 
implemented, and that the IMF governing structures needed to be modernised to reect the 
reality of emerging markets and developing countries.
e genesis of the NDB has at its core the determination of the BRICS to reshape the 
international nancial architecture to reect their growing economic weight (though they 
have averred their intention to co-operate with existing multilateral and regional nancial 
institutions). e NDB constitutes a dynamic mechanism for achieving this outside the 
Bretton Woods framework, while at the same time oering considerable exibility for the 
BRICS and other developing countries to expand their subscribed capital in the NDB as the 
weight of their own economies increases in the global economy. In contrast, this has proven 
very dicult to do within the Bretton Woods governance structures.
SIZE OF CAPITAL OF THE NDB.
While the initial capital for the NDB is to be provided in equal shares by the ve BRICS 
countries, the initial capital of US$ 100 billion for the CRA will be underwritten in greater 
share by China, which will provide US$ 41 billion of it. With foreign exchange reserves of 
US$ 3.8 trillion, the depth of China’s nancial strength will be the key underpinning of the 
NDB and CRA, as well as a potential source of considerable replenishment capital as the 
NDB and CRA commence operations. e important role China plays in the NDB is 
reected in the decision to locate its headquarters in Shanghai.
e initial capital of the NDB is not necessarily limited to the BRICS’ US$ 50 billion, as 
other developing countries will be invited to join and subscribe capital to the NDB. If the 
NDB is able to attract signicant subscribed capital from other sovereign states in addition 
to the BRICS, it would considerably increase the amount of total development nance that 
the NDB is able to provide. By way of comparison, as at June 2014, the total subscribed 
capital of the World Bank was US$ 233 billion, with paid-in capital of US$ 14.4 billion and 
Total Shareholder’s Equity of US$ 39 billion.
One of the strengths of the World Bank is its credit rating, reecting its sound nancial 
position as well as the strength and diversity of its government shareholders. Standard and 
TABLE 1.  BRICS VOTING RIGHTS IN THE IMF COMPARED TO GDP.
(GDP share measured in nominal US Dollar terms; IMF Voting Rights as of August 2014)
   % Share of IMF Voting Rights  % Share of World GDP
China   3.81      12.4
India   2.34      2.6
Russia   2.39      2.8
Brazil   1.72      3.0
South Africa  0.78      0.5
TOTAL  11.04      21.2
Sources: IMF; IHS
With China and India having grown more rapidly than the US and Europe for decades and 
projected to continue to do so over the next two decades, the disproportion of the BRICS 
share of IMF voting rights compared to their share of world GDP can only widen unless 
substantial reforms are made to the governance and voting rights structures of the Bretton 
Woods institutions. 
Based on IHS’ long-term projections of world GDP, China will be the world’s largest 
economy by 2025, when it will account for 19.9% of world GDP, while India is projected to 
account for 5.5%. e Asian BRICS alone will thus have over 25% of world GDP, compared 
to their combined IMF voting rights total of 6.15% at present. Unless there is far more rapid 
progress in IMF voting right reforms than is currently evident, the Asian BRICS will 
confront a major asymmetry between their weight in the global economy and their role in the 
governance of the IMF.
Equally provocative to the developing nations in regard to the governance of the Bretton 
Woods institutions is the agreement between the US and Europe that the Managing Director 
of the IMF should be European and the President of the World Bank should be American. 
is convention has been adhered to since the foundation of the IMF and World Bank; no 
developing country national has ever led either multilateral institution in the last 70 years. 
President Obama attempted to make amends for the unfairness of this state of aairs by 
nominating a US citizen of Korean ethnicity to become the World Bank President in 2012. 
But this does not fundamentally redress the gross imbalance between the BRICS’ weight in 
the global economy and their voting rights in the Bretton Woods institutions. e concerns 
amongst developing countries about the delay to IMF quota and governance reforms were 
reected in the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting held in Istanbul 
on 9-10 February 2015. is was a key issue highlighted in the G20 Communiqué released 
after the meeting:
RESHAPING THE FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE.
eir eorts to reshape the Bretton Woods governance structures having essentially come to 
naught, one initiatives that has been under discussion since 2012 amongst the BRIC 
countries was the establishment of their own development bank. A resolution to do just that 
was formally approved by the BRICS at their summit in South Africa in 2013, and detailed 
planning was subsequently undertaken in the lead-up to the 6th BRICS Summit in Fortaleza 
in July 2014. ere and then, the formal decision was taken to set up the “New Development 
Bank” (NDB) which had initial authorised capital of US$ 100 billion and initial subscribed 
capital of US$ 50 billion, along with a Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) with capital 
of US$ 100 billion.
An Inter-Governmental Agreement was signed on 15 July 2014 by Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa to establish the NDB and CRA. e initial subscribed capital of the 
NDB will be provided in equal shares by the ve founding member countries.
e remit of the NDB will be to nance infrastructure and sustainable development projects, 
while the CRA is to be an external account support facility to help developing countries 
manage balance of payments crises. 
e NDB is set up to provide loans, equity participation, guarantees and other nancial 
instruments. e BRICS members also intend the NDB to have discretion to co-operate 
with international organisations, as well as public and private organisations, particularly with 
international nancial institutions and national development banks.
 
countries have considerable experience in these principles through their regulatory and 
supervisory responsibilities in their domestic banking systems. ere is enough capacity and 
knowledge within the BRICS to craft best practice standards for the NDB and the other 
institutions now being created.
Another major challenge to the BRICS and other developing countries in attempting to 
reshape the international nancial architecture stems from signicant foreign exchange 
reserve constraints, which most developing countries still face. NDB, AIIB and Silk Road 
Fund bear potential to rapidly transform global development nance. On the other hand, it 
is unlikely the developing countries as a group can play a signicant role in international 
crisis prevention and resolution for developing countries in the near to medium term, with 
even some of the largest developing countries facing considerable challenges due to volatile 
international capital ows. 
e constraints on the foreign exchange reserves of both Russia and India have been tested by 
recent economic crises. India’s economic crisis in 2013 triggered a protracted depreciation of 
the rupee that forced the Reserve Bank of India to intervene in currency markets over a 
period of months, and deplete its foreign exchange reserves, in order to smooth the 
depreciation. e Russian economic crisis that commenced in 2014 is still unfolding: capital 
ight in 2014 was estimated by the Central Bank of Russia at US$ 128 billion (e Moscow 
Times, November 10, 2014). e Central Bank is estimated to have used up US$ 80 billion 
of its foreign exchange reserves to intervene to stabilise the sharp depreciation of the rouble 
in 2014 (Reuters News, December 17, 2014). Total foreign exchange reserves are estimated 
to have declined from US$ 510 billion at the end of 2013 to US$ 416 billion by 
mid-December 2014. 
On the other hand, China’s capacity to intervene to stabilise global crises could increase 
signicantly if China manages to introduce full currency convertibility and establish the yuan 
as a global reserve currency. But this is still a long-term goal. 
CONCLUSION.
e developing countries’ long-simmering discontent over the Bretton Woods nancial 
architecture, notably the allocation of voting rights, has resulted in a revolution in global 
development nance that is being led by China. 
China’s rapid economic ascent over the last two decades has led to its having become the 
world’s second largest economy. In the process it has acquired the capacity to act as the 
nancial mainstay of a number of new initiatives for development nancing which can be led 
by developing countries.
warted in playing the leading decision-making role in the IMF and World Bank that it 
deserves, China has instead led the creation of new multilateral development nance 
institutions governed by the developing countries. China is using its vast reserves to lend 
nancial strength to these institutions, although other developing countries are also 
providing capital.
e NDB, AIIB and Silk Road Fund combined bear potential to signicantly increase the 
total multilateral nancing available for economic development in the medium-term, and 
will give developing countries a greater voice in governing global development nance in the 
next decade and beyond.
For the present, however, the capacity of the BRICS and other developing countries to 
intervene in nancial crisis prevention and resolution remains limited due to constraints on 
the foreign exchange reserves of most large developing countries, with the possible exception 
of China. 
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it positions itself within the institutional membership as primus inter pares rather than the 
dominant shareholder driving all decision-making.
irdly, these new development institutions will be an important counterbalance to the 
political weight of the West, giving China a greater voice in global development nance. is 
will become more important politically and economically for China as it becomes the world’s 
largest economy, given that its participation in the World Bank and IMF belie its stature in 
the global economy. 
THE CHALLENGES AHEAD.
e New Development Bank and the AIIB and Silk Road Fund will face considerable 
hurdles, not least of which are the crafting of an ecient governance- and a world-class 
prudential regulatory structure that can avoid the pitfalls of overt politicisation of the new 
institutions. However, with the correct design, the BRICS’ New Development Bank could 
become an important new lender addressing the economic development and infrastructure 
nancing needs of developing countries worldwide. e establishment of the BRICS’ Bank 
at the same time as the AIIB and Silk Road Fund has the potential to signicantly reshape the 
global nancial architecture of development nance.
e governance of the new multilateral nance institutions is very much under scrutiny. To 
a large extent, this reects international perceptions about issues such as corruption in 
developing countries, with the BRICS countries still poorly perceived by international 
standards. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, which ranks 175 
countries, in 2014 had South Africa the highest ranked amongst the BRICS, at 67th, with 
Brazil in 69th place, India 85th, China 100th and Russia 136th. is is on an international 
ranking spectrum in which Denmark was 1st and North Korea and Somalia were ranked 
equally last, at 174th.
A key challenge for the founding countries of the NDB, AIIB and Silk Road Fund will be to 
establish governance structures and decision-making systems having a high degree of 
transparency, integrity, and independence from political inuence in making lending 
decisions.  
Well-established international best practices for governance of nancial institutions exist 
already, and the BRICS central banks as well as other central banks from developing 
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Poor’s gave the World Bank an AAA foreign currency credit rating in its April 2014 report, 
and Moody’s gave it an Aaa long-term issuer credit rating in January 2014. e World Bank’s 
strong credit ratings from international rating agencies, combined with its extremely sound 
nancial management and liquidity position, give it excellent access to international capital 
markets for its programs.
In comparison, the NDB will probably have a less favourable nancial prole in the view of 
international capital markets, due to the smaller number of government shareholders and 
their lower sovereign credit ratings in comparison to the major shareholders of the World 
Bank. In addition, the nancial governance and loan portfolio of the NDB will not have an 
established track record to begin with, which will also lend it a less favourable credit rating in 
international nancial markets, and make the cost of borrowing higher.
On the other hand, the NDB is likely to benet from its access to funding from the 
state-owned banks of the BRICS countries, notably Chinese state-owned banks, which could 
provide a very large potential source of nancing for the NDB.
Stephany Grith-Jones, the eminent professor of development economics at Columbia 
University, has recently estimated that, given initial capital of US$ 100 billion, the NDB 
could be lending up to US$ 34 billion annually in 20 years’ time (UNCTAD Discussion 
Paper No. 215, April 2014); which is roughly equivalent to the current annual lending of the 
World Bank.
e exact annual lending levels of the NDB will be determined by a complex mix of factors, 
but the key point is that the governance structure of the NDB does allow for the future 
growth of the Chinese and Indian economies to be readily matched by increased capital 
subscriptions to the NDB. If the total size of the Chinese and Indian economies does indeed 
reach 25% of world GDP by 2025, as IHS long-term projections indicate, this would result 
in very sizeable increases in the NDB’s total capitalisation and in its annual lending to 
developing countries.
CHINA’S PARALLEL INITIATIVES.
China has launched other initiatives to expand infrastructure nancing for developing 
countries in Asia. In October 2014, 21 Asian countries agreed to establish a new Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) for which China will provide up to 50% of the initial 
capital. In November 2014 at the APEC Summit, President Xi also announced the creation 
of the new Silk Road Fund to improve connectivity in Asia, for which China will provide 
US$ 40 billion of capital.
China is uniquely positioned amongst large emerging markets to be capable of funding 
signicant development nance initiatives like the NDB, with foreign exchange reserves 
estimated at US$ 3.8 trillion as at December 2014. Recognising that such initiatives will 
strengthen its political and economic ties with other developing nations, China has now 
begun to exercise more signicant leadership in global development nance. In addition to 
the NDB in July 2014, China has led an initiative to create an Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB), of which the Memorandum of Understanding was signed by 21 
Asian countries on October 24th 2014. e AIIB had initial authorised capital of US$ 100 
billion, with subscribed capital likely to be around US$ 50 billion. China has stated its 
willingness to provide up to 50% of the initial capital for the AIIB. e headquarters of the 
AIIB will be located in Beijing.
e AIIB has raised concerns in some quarters about a potential rivalry with the World Bank 
or the Asian Development Bank, with some major Asia-Pacic countries having remained on 
the sidelines. For many Asian developing countries, however, the AIIB is a much-needed 
additional source of infrastructure nance, and the Chinese initiative has been warmly 
welcomed by many of them.
Like the NDB, the AIIB creates a mechanism for China and other developing countries to 
reshape the global nancial architecture in development nance. China is redoubling its 
eorts to expand its role in international development nance by committing US$ 40 billion 
to a new Silk Road Fund that is to nance infrastructure connectivity in emerging Asia. 
China made the announcement at the November 2014 APEC Leaders’ Summit in Beijing.
 
From the Chinese perspective, the NDB, AIIB and Silk Road Fund achieve a number of 
strategic objectives. Firstly, they provide developing countries a source of development 
nancing that is not under the dominion and tutelage of the Bretton Woods institutions with 
their lending conditionality and their one-sided governing mechanisms.
Secondly, China will be the key source of capital for these new institutions, which from a 
geopolitical perspective extends China’s inuence amongst developing countries, even while 
e Fortaleza Declaration claimed that the NDB will strengthen co-operation among the 
BRICS, and also supplement the work of multilateral and regional nancial institutions in 
global development. e Declaration pointedly added that the BRICS members were 
“disappointed and seriously concerned” that the 2010 IMF reforms had still not been 
implemented, and that the IMF governing structures needed to be modernised to reect the 
reality of emerging markets and developing countries.
e genesis of the NDB has at its core the determination of the BRICS to reshape the 
international nancial architecture to reect their growing economic weight (though they 
have averred their intention to co-operate with existing multilateral and regional nancial 
institutions). e NDB constitutes a dynamic mechanism for achieving this outside the 
Bretton Woods framework, while at the same time oering considerable exibility for the 
BRICS and other developing countries to expand their subscribed capital in the NDB as the 
weight of their own economies increases in the global economy. In contrast, this has proven 
very dicult to do within the Bretton Woods governance structures.
SIZE OF CAPITAL OF THE NDB.
While the initial capital for the NDB is to be provided in equal shares by the ve BRICS 
countries, the initial capital of US$ 100 billion for the CRA will be underwritten in greater 
share by China, which will provide US$ 41 billion of it. With foreign exchange reserves of 
US$ 3.8 trillion, the depth of China’s nancial strength will be the key underpinning of the 
NDB and CRA, as well as a potential source of considerable replenishment capital as the 
NDB and CRA commence operations. e important role China plays in the NDB is 
reected in the decision to locate its headquarters in Shanghai.
e initial capital of the NDB is not necessarily limited to the BRICS’ US$ 50 billion, as 
other developing countries will be invited to join and subscribe capital to the NDB. If the 
NDB is able to attract signicant subscribed capital from other sovereign states in addition 
to the BRICS, it would considerably increase the amount of total development nance that 
the NDB is able to provide. By way of comparison, as at June 2014, the total subscribed 
capital of the World Bank was US$ 233 billion, with paid-in capital of US$ 14.4 billion and 
Total Shareholder’s Equity of US$ 39 billion.
One of the strengths of the World Bank is its credit rating, reecting its sound nancial 
position as well as the strength and diversity of its government shareholders. Standard and 
TABLE 1.  BRICS VOTING RIGHTS IN THE IMF COMPARED TO GDP.
(GDP share measured in nominal US Dollar terms; IMF Voting Rights as of August 2014)
   % Share of IMF Voting Rights  % Share of World GDP
China   3.81      12.4
India   2.34      2.6
Russia   2.39      2.8
Brazil   1.72      3.0
South Africa  0.78      0.5
TOTAL  11.04      21.2
Sources: IMF; IHS
With China and India having grown more rapidly than the US and Europe for decades and 
projected to continue to do so over the next two decades, the disproportion of the BRICS 
share of IMF voting rights compared to their share of world GDP can only widen unless 
substantial reforms are made to the governance and voting rights structures of the Bretton 
Woods institutions. 
Based on IHS’ long-term projections of world GDP, China will be the world’s largest 
economy by 2025, when it will account for 19.9% of world GDP, while India is projected to 
account for 5.5%. e Asian BRICS alone will thus have over 25% of world GDP, compared 
to their combined IMF voting rights total of 6.15% at present. Unless there is far more rapid 
progress in IMF voting right reforms than is currently evident, the Asian BRICS will 
confront a major asymmetry between their weight in the global economy and their role in the 
governance of the IMF.
Equally provocative to the developing nations in regard to the governance of the Bretton 
Woods institutions is the agreement between the US and Europe that the Managing Director 
of the IMF should be European and the President of the World Bank should be American. 
is convention has been adhered to since the foundation of the IMF and World Bank; no 
developing country national has ever led either multilateral institution in the last 70 years. 
President Obama attempted to make amends for the unfairness of this state of aairs by 
nominating a US citizen of Korean ethnicity to become the World Bank President in 2012. 
But this does not fundamentally redress the gross imbalance between the BRICS’ weight in 
the global economy and their voting rights in the Bretton Woods institutions. e concerns 
amongst developing countries about the delay to IMF quota and governance reforms were 
reected in the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting held in Istanbul 
on 9-10 February 2015. is was a key issue highlighted in the G20 Communiqué released 
after the meeting:
RESHAPING THE FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE.
eir eorts to reshape the Bretton Woods governance structures having essentially come to 
naught, one initiatives that has been under discussion since 2012 amongst the BRIC 
countries was the establishment of their own development bank. A resolution to do just that 
was formally approved by the BRICS at their summit in South Africa in 2013, and detailed 
planning was subsequently undertaken in the lead-up to the 6th BRICS Summit in Fortaleza 
in July 2014. ere and then, the formal decision was taken to set up the “New Development 
Bank” (NDB) which had initial authorised capital of US$ 100 billion and initial subscribed 
capital of US$ 50 billion, along with a Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) with capital 
of US$ 100 billion.
An Inter-Governmental Agreement was signed on 15 July 2014 by Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa to establish the NDB and CRA. e initial subscribed capital of the 
NDB will be provided in equal shares by the ve founding member countries.
e remit of the NDB will be to nance infrastructure and sustainable development projects, 
while the CRA is to be an external account support facility to help developing countries 
manage balance of payments crises. 
e NDB is set up to provide loans, equity participation, guarantees and other nancial 
instruments. e BRICS members also intend the NDB to have discretion to co-operate 
with international organisations, as well as public and private organisations, particularly with 
international nancial institutions and national development banks.
 
countries have considerable experience in these principles through their regulatory and 
supervisory responsibilities in their domestic banking systems. ere is enough capacity and 
knowledge within the BRICS to craft best practice standards for the NDB and the other 
institutions now being created.
Another major challenge to the BRICS and other developing countries in attempting to 
reshape the international nancial architecture stems from signicant foreign exchange 
reserve constraints, which most developing countries still face. NDB, AIIB and Silk Road 
Fund bear potential to rapidly transform global development nance. On the other hand, it 
is unlikely the developing countries as a group can play a signicant role in international 
crisis prevention and resolution for developing countries in the near to medium term, with 
even some of the largest developing countries facing considerable challenges due to volatile 
international capital ows. 
e constraints on the foreign exchange reserves of both Russia and India have been tested by 
recent economic crises. India’s economic crisis in 2013 triggered a protracted depreciation of 
the rupee that forced the Reserve Bank of India to intervene in currency markets over a 
period of months, and deplete its foreign exchange reserves, in order to smooth the 
depreciation. e Russian economic crisis that commenced in 2014 is still unfolding: capital 
ight in 2014 was estimated by the Central Bank of Russia at US$ 128 billion (e Moscow 
Times, November 10, 2014). e Central Bank is estimated to have used up US$ 80 billion 
of its foreign exchange reserves to intervene to stabilise the sharp depreciation of the rouble 
in 2014 (Reuters News, December 17, 2014). Total foreign exchange reserves are estimated 
to have declined from US$ 510 billion at the end of 2013 to US$ 416 billion by 
mid-December 2014. 
On the other hand, China’s capacity to intervene to stabilise global crises could increase 
signicantly if China manages to introduce full currency convertibility and establish the yuan 
as a global reserve currency. But this is still a long-term goal. 
CONCLUSION.
e developing countries’ long-simmering discontent over the Bretton Woods nancial 
architecture, notably the allocation of voting rights, has resulted in a revolution in global 
development nance that is being led by China. 
China’s rapid economic ascent over the last two decades has led to its having become the 
world’s second largest economy. In the process it has acquired the capacity to act as the 
nancial mainstay of a number of new initiatives for development nancing which can be led 
by developing countries.
warted in playing the leading decision-making role in the IMF and World Bank that it 
deserves, China has instead led the creation of new multilateral development nance 
institutions governed by the developing countries. China is using its vast reserves to lend 
nancial strength to these institutions, although other developing countries are also 
providing capital.
e NDB, AIIB and Silk Road Fund combined bear potential to signicantly increase the 
total multilateral nancing available for economic development in the medium-term, and 
will give developing countries a greater voice in governing global development nance in the 
next decade and beyond.
For the present, however, the capacity of the BRICS and other developing countries to 
intervene in nancial crisis prevention and resolution remains limited due to constraints on 
the foreign exchange reserves of most large developing countries, with the possible exception 
of China. 
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it positions itself within the institutional membership as primus inter pares rather than the 
dominant shareholder driving all decision-making.
irdly, these new development institutions will be an important counterbalance to the 
political weight of the West, giving China a greater voice in global development nance. is 
will become more important politically and economically for China as it becomes the world’s 
largest economy, given that its participation in the World Bank and IMF belie its stature in 
the global economy. 
THE CHALLENGES AHEAD.
e New Development Bank and the AIIB and Silk Road Fund will face considerable 
hurdles, not least of which are the crafting of an ecient governance- and a world-class 
prudential regulatory structure that can avoid the pitfalls of overt politicisation of the new 
institutions. However, with the correct design, the BRICS’ New Development Bank could 
become an important new lender addressing the economic development and infrastructure 
nancing needs of developing countries worldwide. e establishment of the BRICS’ Bank 
at the same time as the AIIB and Silk Road Fund has the potential to signicantly reshape the 
global nancial architecture of development nance.
e governance of the new multilateral nance institutions is very much under scrutiny. To 
a large extent, this reects international perceptions about issues such as corruption in 
developing countries, with the BRICS countries still poorly perceived by international 
standards. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, which ranks 175 
countries, in 2014 had South Africa the highest ranked amongst the BRICS, at 67th, with 
Brazil in 69th place, India 85th, China 100th and Russia 136th. is is on an international 
ranking spectrum in which Denmark was 1st and North Korea and Somalia were ranked 
equally last, at 174th.
A key challenge for the founding countries of the NDB, AIIB and Silk Road Fund will be to 
establish governance structures and decision-making systems having a high degree of 
transparency, integrity, and independence from political inuence in making lending 
decisions.  
Well-established international best practices for governance of nancial institutions exist 
already, and the BRICS central banks as well as other central banks from developing 
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Poor’s gave the World Bank an AAA foreign currency credit rating in its April 2014 report, 
and Moody’s gave it an Aaa long-term issuer credit rating in January 2014. e World Bank’s 
strong credit ratings from international rating agencies, combined with its extremely sound 
nancial management and liquidity position, give it excellent access to international capital 
markets for its programs.
In comparison, the NDB will probably have a less favourable nancial prole in the view of 
international capital markets, due to the smaller number of government shareholders and 
their lower sovereign credit ratings in comparison to the major shareholders of the World 
Bank. In addition, the nancial governance and loan portfolio of the NDB will not have an 
established track record to begin with, which will also lend it a less favourable credit rating in 
international nancial markets, and make the cost of borrowing higher.
On the other hand, the NDB is likely to benet from its access to funding from the 
state-owned banks of the BRICS countries, notably Chinese state-owned banks, which could 
provide a very large potential source of nancing for the NDB.
Stephany Grith-Jones, the eminent professor of development economics at Columbia 
University, has recently estimated that, given initial capital of US$ 100 billion, the NDB 
could be lending up to US$ 34 billion annually in 20 years’ time (UNCTAD Discussion 
Paper No. 215, April 2014); which is roughly equivalent to the current annual lending of the 
World Bank.
e exact annual lending levels of the NDB will be determined by a complex mix of factors, 
but the key point is that the governance structure of the NDB does allow for the future 
growth of the Chinese and Indian economies to be readily matched by increased capital 
subscriptions to the NDB. If the total size of the Chinese and Indian economies does indeed 
reach 25% of world GDP by 2025, as IHS long-term projections indicate, this would result 
in very sizeable increases in the NDB’s total capitalisation and in its annual lending to 
developing countries.
CHINA’S PARALLEL INITIATIVES.
China has launched other initiatives to expand infrastructure nancing for developing 
countries in Asia. In October 2014, 21 Asian countries agreed to establish a new Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) for which China will provide up to 50% of the initial 
capital. In November 2014 at the APEC Summit, President Xi also announced the creation 
of the new Silk Road Fund to improve connectivity in Asia, for which China will provide 
US$ 40 billion of capital.
China is uniquely positioned amongst large emerging markets to be capable of funding 
signicant development nance initiatives like the NDB, with foreign exchange reserves 
estimated at US$ 3.8 trillion as at December 2014. Recognising that such initiatives will 
strengthen its political and economic ties with other developing nations, China has now 
begun to exercise more signicant leadership in global development nance. In addition to 
the NDB in July 2014, China has led an initiative to create an Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB), of which the Memorandum of Understanding was signed by 21 
Asian countries on October 24th 2014. e AIIB had initial authorised capital of US$ 100 
billion, with subscribed capital likely to be around US$ 50 billion. China has stated its 
willingness to provide up to 50% of the initial capital for the AIIB. e headquarters of the 
AIIB will be located in Beijing.
e AIIB has raised concerns in some quarters about a potential rivalry with the World Bank 
or the Asian Development Bank, with some major Asia-Pacic countries having remained on 
the sidelines. For many Asian developing countries, however, the AIIB is a much-needed 
additional source of infrastructure nance, and the Chinese initiative has been warmly 
welcomed by many of them.
Like the NDB, the AIIB creates a mechanism for China and other developing countries to 
reshape the global nancial architecture in development nance. China is redoubling its 
eorts to expand its role in international development nance by committing US$ 40 billion 
to a new Silk Road Fund that is to nance infrastructure connectivity in emerging Asia. 
China made the announcement at the November 2014 APEC Leaders’ Summit in Beijing.
 
From the Chinese perspective, the NDB, AIIB and Silk Road Fund achieve a number of 
strategic objectives. Firstly, they provide developing countries a source of development 
nancing that is not under the dominion and tutelage of the Bretton Woods institutions with 
their lending conditionality and their one-sided governing mechanisms.
Secondly, China will be the key source of capital for these new institutions, which from a 
geopolitical perspective extends China’s inuence amongst developing countries, even while 
e Fortaleza Declaration claimed that the NDB will strengthen co-operation among the 
BRICS, and also supplement the work of multilateral and regional nancial institutions in 
global development. e Declaration pointedly added that the BRICS members were 
“disappointed and seriously concerned” that the 2010 IMF reforms had still not been 
implemented, and that the IMF governing structures needed to be modernised to reect the 
reality of emerging markets and developing countries.
e genesis of the NDB has at its core the determination of the BRICS to reshape the 
international nancial architecture to reect their growing economic weight (though they 
have averred their intention to co-operate with existing multilateral and regional nancial 
institutions). e NDB constitutes a dynamic mechanism for achieving this outside the 
Bretton Woods framework, while at the same time oering considerable exibility for the 
BRICS and other developing countries to expand their subscribed capital in the NDB as the 
weight of their own economies increases in the global economy. In contrast, this has proven 
very dicult to do within the Bretton Woods governance structures.
SIZE OF CAPITAL OF THE NDB.
While the initial capital for the NDB is to be provided in equal shares by the ve BRICS 
countries, the initial capital of US$ 100 billion for the CRA will be underwritten in greater 
share by China, which will provide US$ 41 billion of it. With foreign exchange reserves of 
US$ 3.8 trillion, the depth of China’s nancial strength will be the key underpinning of the 
NDB and CRA, as well as a potential source of considerable replenishment capital as the 
NDB and CRA commence operations. e important role China plays in the NDB is 
reected in the decision to locate its headquarters in Shanghai.
e initial capital of the NDB is not necessarily limited to the BRICS’ US$ 50 billion, as 
other developing countries will be invited to join and subscribe capital to the NDB. If the 
NDB is able to attract signicant subscribed capital from other sovereign states in addition 
to the BRICS, it would considerably increase the amount of total development nance that 
the NDB is able to provide. By way of comparison, as at June 2014, the total subscribed 
capital of the World Bank was US$ 233 billion, with paid-in capital of US$ 14.4 billion and 
Total Shareholder’s Equity of US$ 39 billion.
One of the strengths of the World Bank is its credit rating, reecting its sound nancial 
position as well as the strength and diversity of its government shareholders. Standard and 
TABLE 1.  BRICS VOTING RIGHTS IN THE IMF COMPARED TO GDP.
(GDP share measured in nominal US Dollar terms; IMF Voting Rights as of August 2014)
   % Share of IMF Voting Rights  % Share of World GDP
China   3.81      12.4
India   2.34      2.6
Russia   2.39      2.8
Brazil   1.72      3.0
South Africa  0.78      0.5
TOTAL  11.04      21.2
Sources: IMF; IHS
With China and India having grown more rapidly than the US and Europe for decades and 
projected to continue to do so over the next two decades, the disproportion of the BRICS 
share of IMF voting rights compared to their share of world GDP can only widen unless 
substantial reforms are made to the governance and voting rights structures of the Bretton 
Woods institutions. 
Based on IHS’ long-term projections of world GDP, China will be the world’s largest 
economy by 2025, when it will account for 19.9% of world GDP, while India is projected to 
account for 5.5%. e Asian BRICS alone will thus have over 25% of world GDP, compared 
to their combined IMF voting rights total of 6.15% at present. Unless there is far more rapid 
progress in IMF voting right reforms than is currently evident, the Asian BRICS will 
confront a major asymmetry between their weight in the global economy and their role in the 
governance of the IMF.
Equally provocative to the developing nations in regard to the governance of the Bretton 
Woods institutions is the agreement between the US and Europe that the Managing Director 
of the IMF should be European and the President of the World Bank should be American. 
is convention has been adhered to since the foundation of the IMF and World Bank; no 
developing country national has ever led either multilateral institution in the last 70 years. 
President Obama attempted to make amends for the unfairness of this state of aairs by 
nominating a US citizen of Korean ethnicity to become the World Bank President in 2012. 
But this does not fundamentally redress the gross imbalance between the BRICS’ weight in 
the global economy and their voting rights in the Bretton Woods institutions. e concerns 
amongst developing countries about the delay to IMF quota and governance reforms were 
reected in the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting held in Istanbul 
on 9-10 February 2015. is was a key issue highlighted in the G20 Communiqué released 
after the meeting:
RESHAPING THE FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE.
eir eorts to reshape the Bretton Woods governance structures having essentially come to 
naught, one initiatives that has been under discussion since 2012 amongst the BRIC 
countries was the establishment of their own development bank. A resolution to do just that 
was formally approved by the BRICS at their summit in South Africa in 2013, and detailed 
planning was subsequently undertaken in the lead-up to the 6th BRICS Summit in Fortaleza 
in July 2014. ere and then, the formal decision was taken to set up the “New Development 
Bank” (NDB) which had initial authorised capital of US$ 100 billion and initial subscribed 
capital of US$ 50 billion, along with a Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) with capital 
of US$ 100 billion.
An Inter-Governmental Agreement was signed on 15 July 2014 by Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa to establish the NDB and CRA. e initial subscribed capital of the 
NDB will be provided in equal shares by the ve founding member countries.
e remit of the NDB will be to nance infrastructure and sustainable development projects, 
while the CRA is to be an external account support facility to help developing countries 
manage balance of payments crises. 
e NDB is set up to provide loans, equity participation, guarantees and other nancial 
instruments. e BRICS members also intend the NDB to have discretion to co-operate 
with international organisations, as well as public and private organisations, particularly with 
international nancial institutions and national development banks.
 
countries have considerable experience in these principles through their regulatory and 
supervisory responsibilities in their domestic banking systems. ere is enough capacity and 
knowledge within the BRICS to craft best practice standards for the NDB and the other 
institutions now being created.
Another major challenge to the BRICS and other developing countries in attempting to 
reshape the international nancial architecture stems from signicant foreign exchange 
reserve constraints, which most developing countries still face. NDB, AIIB and Silk Road 
Fund bear potential to rapidly transform global development nance. On the other hand, it 
is unlikely the developing countries as a group can play a signicant role in international 
crisis prevention and resolution for developing countries in the near to medium term, with 
even some of the largest developing countries facing considerable challenges due to volatile 
international capital ows. 
e constraints on the foreign exchange reserves of both Russia and India have been tested by 
recent economic crises. India’s economic crisis in 2013 triggered a protracted depreciation of 
the rupee that forced the Reserve Bank of India to intervene in currency markets over a 
period of months, and deplete its foreign exchange reserves, in order to smooth the 
depreciation. e Russian economic crisis that commenced in 2014 is still unfolding: capital 
ight in 2014 was estimated by the Central Bank of Russia at US$ 128 billion (e Moscow 
Times, November 10, 2014). e Central Bank is estimated to have used up US$ 80 billion 
of its foreign exchange reserves to intervene to stabilise the sharp depreciation of the rouble 
in 2014 (Reuters News, December 17, 2014). Total foreign exchange reserves are estimated 
to have declined from US$ 510 billion at the end of 2013 to US$ 416 billion by 
mid-December 2014. 
On the other hand, China’s capacity to intervene to stabilise global crises could increase 
signicantly if China manages to introduce full currency convertibility and establish the yuan 
as a global reserve currency. But this is still a long-term goal. 
CONCLUSION.
e developing countries’ long-simmering discontent over the Bretton Woods nancial 
architecture, notably the allocation of voting rights, has resulted in a revolution in global 
development nance that is being led by China. 
China’s rapid economic ascent over the last two decades has led to its having become the 
world’s second largest economy. In the process it has acquired the capacity to act as the 
nancial mainstay of a number of new initiatives for development nancing which can be led 
by developing countries.
warted in playing the leading decision-making role in the IMF and World Bank that it 
deserves, China has instead led the creation of new multilateral development nance 
institutions governed by the developing countries. China is using its vast reserves to lend 
nancial strength to these institutions, although other developing countries are also 
providing capital.
e NDB, AIIB and Silk Road Fund combined bear potential to signicantly increase the 
total multilateral nancing available for economic development in the medium-term, and 
will give developing countries a greater voice in governing global development nance in the 
next decade and beyond.
For the present, however, the capacity of the BRICS and other developing countries to 
intervene in nancial crisis prevention and resolution remains limited due to constraints on 
the foreign exchange reserves of most large developing countries, with the possible exception 
of China. 
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it positions itself within the institutional membership as primus inter pares rather than the 
dominant shareholder driving all decision-making.
irdly, these new development institutions will be an important counterbalance to the 
political weight of the West, giving China a greater voice in global development nance. is 
will become more important politically and economically for China as it becomes the world’s 
largest economy, given that its participation in the World Bank and IMF belie its stature in 
the global economy. 
THE CHALLENGES AHEAD.
e New Development Bank and the AIIB and Silk Road Fund will face considerable 
hurdles, not least of which are the crafting of an ecient governance- and a world-class 
prudential regulatory structure that can avoid the pitfalls of overt politicisation of the new 
institutions. However, with the correct design, the BRICS’ New Development Bank could 
become an important new lender addressing the economic development and infrastructure 
nancing needs of developing countries worldwide. e establishment of the BRICS’ Bank 
at the same time as the AIIB and Silk Road Fund has the potential to signicantly reshape the 
global nancial architecture of development nance.
e governance of the new multilateral nance institutions is very much under scrutiny. To 
a large extent, this reects international perceptions about issues such as corruption in 
developing countries, with the BRICS countries still poorly perceived by international 
standards. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, which ranks 175 
countries, in 2014 had South Africa the highest ranked amongst the BRICS, at 67th, with 
Brazil in 69th place, India 85th, China 100th and Russia 136th. is is on an international 
ranking spectrum in which Denmark was 1st and North Korea and Somalia were ranked 
equally last, at 174th.
A key challenge for the founding countries of the NDB, AIIB and Silk Road Fund will be to 
establish governance structures and decision-making systems having a high degree of 
transparency, integrity, and independence from political inuence in making lending 
decisions.  
Well-established international best practices for governance of nancial institutions exist 
already, and the BRICS central banks as well as other central banks from developing 
Poor’s gave the World Bank an AAA foreign currency credit rating in its April 2014 report, 
and Moody’s gave it an Aaa long-term issuer credit rating in January 2014. e World Bank’s 
strong credit ratings from international rating agencies, combined with its extremely sound 
nancial management and liquidity position, give it excellent access to international capital 
markets for its programs.
In comparison, the NDB will probably have a less favourable nancial prole in the view of 
international capital markets, due to the smaller number of government shareholders and 
their lower sovereign credit ratings in comparison to the major shareholders of the World 
Bank. In addition, the nancial governance and loan portfolio of the NDB will not have an 
established track record to begin with, which will also lend it a less favourable credit rating in 
international nancial markets, and make the cost of borrowing higher.
On the other hand, the NDB is likely to benet from its access to funding from the 
state-owned banks of the BRICS countries, notably Chinese state-owned banks, which could 
provide a very large potential source of nancing for the NDB.
Stephany Grith-Jones, the eminent professor of development economics at Columbia 
University, has recently estimated that, given initial capital of US$ 100 billion, the NDB 
could be lending up to US$ 34 billion annually in 20 years’ time (UNCTAD Discussion 
Paper No. 215, April 2014); which is roughly equivalent to the current annual lending of the 
World Bank.
e exact annual lending levels of the NDB will be determined by a complex mix of factors, 
but the key point is that the governance structure of the NDB does allow for the future 
growth of the Chinese and Indian economies to be readily matched by increased capital 
subscriptions to the NDB. If the total size of the Chinese and Indian economies does indeed 
reach 25% of world GDP by 2025, as IHS long-term projections indicate, this would result 
in very sizeable increases in the NDB’s total capitalisation and in its annual lending to 
developing countries.
CHINA’S PARALLEL INITIATIVES.
China has launched other initiatives to expand infrastructure nancing for developing 
countries in Asia. In October 2014, 21 Asian countries agreed to establish a new Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) for which China will provide up to 50% of the initial 
capital. In November 2014 at the APEC Summit, President Xi also announced the creation 
of the new Silk Road Fund to improve connectivity in Asia, for which China will provide 
US$ 40 billion of capital.
China is uniquely positioned amongst large emerging markets to be capable of funding 
signicant development nance initiatives like the NDB, with foreign exchange reserves 
estimated at US$ 3.8 trillion as at December 2014. Recognising that such initiatives will 
strengthen its political and economic ties with other developing nations, China has now 
begun to exercise more signicant leadership in global development nance. In addition to 
the NDB in July 2014, China has led an initiative to create an Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB), of which the Memorandum of Understanding was signed by 21 
Asian countries on October 24th 2014. e AIIB had initial authorised capital of US$ 100 
billion, with subscribed capital likely to be around US$ 50 billion. China has stated its 
willingness to provide up to 50% of the initial capital for the AIIB. e headquarters of the 
AIIB will be located in Beijing.
e AIIB has raised concerns in some quarters about a potential rivalry with the World Bank 
or the Asian Development Bank, with some major Asia-Pacic countries having remained on 
the sidelines. For many Asian developing countries, however, the AIIB is a much-needed 
additional source of infrastructure nance, and the Chinese initiative has been warmly 
welcomed by many of them.
Like the NDB, the AIIB creates a mechanism for China and other developing countries to 
reshape the global nancial architecture in development nance. China is redoubling its 
eorts to expand its role in international development nance by committing US$ 40 billion 
to a new Silk Road Fund that is to nance infrastructure connectivity in emerging Asia. 
China made the announcement at the November 2014 APEC Leaders’ Summit in Beijing.
 
From the Chinese perspective, the NDB, AIIB and Silk Road Fund achieve a number of 
strategic objectives. Firstly, they provide developing countries a source of development 
nancing that is not under the dominion and tutelage of the Bretton Woods institutions with 
their lending conditionality and their one-sided governing mechanisms.
Secondly, China will be the key source of capital for these new institutions, which from a 
geopolitical perspective extends China’s inuence amongst developing countries, even while 
e Fortaleza Declaration claimed that the NDB will strengthen co-operation among the 
BRICS, and also supplement the work of multilateral and regional nancial institutions in 
global development. e Declaration pointedly added that the BRICS members were 
“disappointed and seriously concerned” that the 2010 IMF reforms had still not been 
implemented, and that the IMF governing structures needed to be modernised to reect the 
reality of emerging markets and developing countries.
e genesis of the NDB has at its core the determination of the BRICS to reshape the 
international nancial architecture to reect their growing economic weight (though they 
have averred their intention to co-operate with existing multilateral and regional nancial 
institutions). e NDB constitutes a dynamic mechanism for achieving this outside the 
Bretton Woods framework, while at the same time oering considerable exibility for the 
BRICS and other developing countries to expand their subscribed capital in the NDB as the 
weight of their own economies increases in the global economy. In contrast, this has proven 
very dicult to do within the Bretton Woods governance structures.
SIZE OF CAPITAL OF THE NDB.
While the initial capital for the NDB is to be provided in equal shares by the ve BRICS 
countries, the initial capital of US$ 100 billion for the CRA will be underwritten in greater 
share by China, which will provide US$ 41 billion of it. With foreign exchange reserves of 
US$ 3.8 trillion, the depth of China’s nancial strength will be the key underpinning of the 
NDB and CRA, as well as a potential source of considerable replenishment capital as the 
NDB and CRA commence operations. e important role China plays in the NDB is 
reected in the decision to locate its headquarters in Shanghai.
e initial capital of the NDB is not necessarily limited to the BRICS’ US$ 50 billion, as 
other developing countries will be invited to join and subscribe capital to the NDB. If the 
NDB is able to attract signicant subscribed capital from other sovereign states in addition 
to the BRICS, it would considerably increase the amount of total development nance that 
the NDB is able to provide. By way of comparison, as at June 2014, the total subscribed 
capital of the World Bank was US$ 233 billion, with paid-in capital of US$ 14.4 billion and 
Total Shareholder’s Equity of US$ 39 billion.
One of the strengths of the World Bank is its credit rating, reecting its sound nancial 
position as well as the strength and diversity of its government shareholders. Standard and 
TABLE 1.  BRICS VOTING RIGHTS IN THE IMF COMPARED TO GDP.
(GDP share measured in nominal US Dollar terms; IMF Voting Rights as of August 2014)
   % Share of IMF Voting Rights  % Share of World GDP
China   3.81      12.4
India   2.34      2.6
Russia   2.39      2.8
Brazil   1.72      3.0
South Africa  0.78      0.5
TOTAL  11.04      21.2
Sources: IMF; IHS
With China and India having grown more rapidly than the US and Europe for decades and 
projected to continue to do so over the next two decades, the disproportion of the BRICS 
share of IMF voting rights compared to their share of world GDP can only widen unless 
substantial reforms are made to the governance and voting rights structures of the Bretton 
Woods institutions. 
Based on IHS’ long-term projections of world GDP, China will be the world’s largest 
economy by 2025, when it will account for 19.9% of world GDP, while India is projected to 
account for 5.5%. e Asian BRICS alone will thus have over 25% of world GDP, compared 
to their combined IMF voting rights total of 6.15% at present. Unless there is far more rapid 
progress in IMF voting right reforms than is currently evident, the Asian BRICS will 
confront a major asymmetry between their weight in the global economy and their role in the 
governance of the IMF.
Equally provocative to the developing nations in regard to the governance of the Bretton 
Woods institutions is the agreement between the US and Europe that the Managing Director 
of the IMF should be European and the President of the World Bank should be American. 
is convention has been adhered to since the foundation of the IMF and World Bank; no 
developing country national has ever led either multilateral institution in the last 70 years. 
President Obama attempted to make amends for the unfairness of this state of aairs by 
nominating a US citizen of Korean ethnicity to become the World Bank President in 2012. 
But this does not fundamentally redress the gross imbalance between the BRICS’ weight in 
the global economy and their voting rights in the Bretton Woods institutions. e concerns 
amongst developing countries about the delay to IMF quota and governance reforms were 
reected in the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting held in Istanbul 
on 9-10 February 2015. is was a key issue highlighted in the G20 Communiqué released 
after the meeting:
RESHAPING THE FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE.
eir eorts to reshape the Bretton Woods governance structures having essentially come to 
naught, one initiatives that has been under discussion since 2012 amongst the BRIC 
countries was the establishment of their own development bank. A resolution to do just that 
was formally approved by the BRICS at their summit in South Africa in 2013, and detailed 
planning was subsequently undertaken in the lead-up to the 6th BRICS Summit in Fortaleza 
in July 2014. ere and then, the formal decision was taken to set up the “New Development 
Bank” (NDB) which had initial authorised capital of US$ 100 billion and initial subscribed 
capital of US$ 50 billion, along with a Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) with capital 
of US$ 100 billion.
An Inter-Governmental Agreement was signed on 15 July 2014 by Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa to establish the NDB and CRA. e initial subscribed capital of the 
NDB will be provided in equal shares by the ve founding member countries.
e remit of the NDB will be to nance infrastructure and sustainable development projects, 
while the CRA is to be an external account support facility to help developing countries 
manage balance of payments crises. 
e NDB is set up to provide loans, equity participation, guarantees and other nancial 
instruments. e BRICS members also intend the NDB to have discretion to co-operate 
with international organisations, as well as public and private organisations, particularly with 
international nancial institutions and national development banks.
 
countries have considerable experience in these principles through their regulatory and 
supervisory responsibilities in their domestic banking systems. ere is enough capacity and 
knowledge within the BRICS to craft best practice standards for the NDB and the other 
institutions now being created.
Another major challenge to the BRICS and other developing countries in attempting to 
reshape the international nancial architecture stems from signicant foreign exchange 
reserve constraints, which most developing countries still face. NDB, AIIB and Silk Road 
Fund bear potential to rapidly transform global development nance. On the other hand, it 
is unlikely the developing countries as a group can play a signicant role in international 
crisis prevention and resolution for developing countries in the near to medium term, with 
even some of the largest developing countries facing considerable challenges due to volatile 
international capital ows. 
e constraints on the foreign exchange reserves of both Russia and India have been tested by 
recent economic crises. India’s economic crisis in 2013 triggered a protracted depreciation of 
the rupee that forced the Reserve Bank of India to intervene in currency markets over a 
period of months, and deplete its foreign exchange reserves, in order to smooth the 
depreciation. e Russian economic crisis that commenced in 2014 is still unfolding: capital 
ight in 2014 was estimated by the Central Bank of Russia at US$ 128 billion (e Moscow 
Times, November 10, 2014). e Central Bank is estimated to have used up US$ 80 billion 
of its foreign exchange reserves to intervene to stabilise the sharp depreciation of the rouble 
in 2014 (Reuters News, December 17, 2014). Total foreign exchange reserves are estimated 
to have declined from US$ 510 billion at the end of 2013 to US$ 416 billion by 
mid-December 2014. 
On the other hand, China’s capacity to intervene to stabilise global crises could increase 
signicantly if China manages to introduce full currency convertibility and establish the yuan 
as a global reserve currency. But this is still a long-term goal. 
CONCLUSION.
e developing countries’ long-simmering discontent over the Bretton Woods nancial 
architecture, notably the allocation of voting rights, has resulted in a revolution in global 
development nance that is being led by China. 
China’s rapid economic ascent over the last two decades has led to its having become the 
world’s second largest economy. In the process it has acquired the capacity to act as the 
nancial mainstay of a number of new initiatives for development nancing which can be led 
by developing countries.
warted in playing the leading decision-making role in the IMF and World Bank that it 
deserves, China has instead led the creation of new multilateral development nance 
institutions governed by the developing countries. China is using its vast reserves to lend 
nancial strength to these institutions, although other developing countries are also 
providing capital.
e NDB, AIIB and Silk Road Fund combined bear potential to signicantly increase the 
total multilateral nancing available for economic development in the medium-term, and 
will give developing countries a greater voice in governing global development nance in the 
next decade and beyond.
For the present, however, the capacity of the BRICS and other developing countries to 
intervene in nancial crisis prevention and resolution remains limited due to constraints on 
the foreign exchange reserves of most large developing countries, with the possible exception 
of China. 
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it positions itself within the institutional membership as primus inter pares rather than the 
dominant shareholder driving all decision-making.
irdly, these new development institutions will be an important counterbalance to the 
political weight of the West, giving China a greater voice in global development nance. is 
will become more important politically and economically for China as it becomes the world’s 
largest economy, given that its participation in the World Bank and IMF belie its stature in 
the global economy. 
THE CHALLENGES AHEAD.
e New Development Bank and the AIIB and Silk Road Fund will face considerable 
hurdles, not least of which are the crafting of an ecient governance- and a world-class 
prudential regulatory structure that can avoid the pitfalls of overt politicisation of the new 
institutions. However, with the correct design, the BRICS’ New Development Bank could 
become an important new lender addressing the economic development and infrastructure 
nancing needs of developing countries worldwide. e establishment of the BRICS’ Bank 
at the same time as the AIIB and Silk Road Fund has the potential to signicantly reshape the 
global nancial architecture of development nance.
e governance of the new multilateral nance institutions is very much under scrutiny. To 
a large extent, this reects international perceptions about issues such as corruption in 
developing countries, with the BRICS countries still poorly perceived by international 
standards. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, which ranks 175 
countries, in 2014 had South Africa the highest ranked amongst the BRICS, at 67th, with 
Brazil in 69th place, India 85th, China 100th and Russia 136th. is is on an international 
ranking spectrum in which Denmark was 1st and North Korea and Somalia were ranked 
equally last, at 174th.
A key challenge for the founding countries of the NDB, AIIB and Silk Road Fund will be to 
establish governance structures and decision-making systems having a high degree of 
transparency, integrity, and independence from political inuence in making lending 
decisions.  
Well-established international best practices for governance of nancial institutions exist 
already, and the BRICS central banks as well as other central banks from developing 
